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Resumo 
 
 
O presente trabalho propõe-se avaliar a importância dos analistas financeiros 
Portugueses testando para isso a fiabilidade no cálculo dos Price Targets e a 
capacidade informativa dos relatórios que produzem. A utilidade dos analistas 
financeiros tem sido há muito estudada, por norma através de duas 
perspectivas: avaliando as consequências do seu trabalho (reacção dos 
mercados às suas recomendações e estratégias de investimento baseadas 
nessas mesmas recomendações) e por outro lado considerando as variáveis 
exógenas que influenciam o seu trabalho (comportamentos tendenciosos e de 
“arrebanhamento”). Acreditamos que antes de avaliar a pertinência destas 
perspectivas, importa averiguar se através dos relatórios que produzem os 
analistas financeiros fornecem a informação que os seus utilizadores 
necessitam. 
Para isso examinamos e codificamos 73 relatórios financeiros de empresas 
que integram o PSI20, testando-os em termos de informatividade e fiabilidade.  
A capacidade informativa é testada em confronto com um relatório ideal 
(baseado nas conclusões do Relatório Jenkins). 
Para testar a confiabilidade no cálculo dos Price Targets investigamos se o 
método e os parâmetros utilizados são expressos com clareza e se o processo 
de cálculo está em conformidade com aquilo que são os princípios teóricos 
aceites. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the importance of Portuguese financial sell-side analysts’ 
reports by testing reliability in firms’ Price Target calculation and information 
aptitude (deliver ability) in the content of sell-side analysts’ reports.  
The importance of sell-side analysts reports has long been studied, mainly in 
two different perspectives: the consequences of their work (market price 
reactions, trading strategies based in analysts’ recommendations) and the 
externalizations that influence their work (herding and bias behaviors).   
We believe that before either perspective can explain their value, analysts 
through their reports should be able to deliver the information users need and 
offer coherent calculation that justifies the Price Targets. 
We explore and encode the complete content of 73 reports from PSI20 listed 
companies, and apply consistency and reliability procedures to test them. 
Informativeness is tested against an ideal report (built mainly from the Jenkins 
Report conclusions).  
To test reliability in the Prices Targets calculations we investigate if the method 
and the parameters of the evaluation are clearly disclosed and if the calculative 
procedure is according to the theoretical conventions. 
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1. Introduction 
Business in general and sell-side financial analysts‘ reports in particular affect 
people‘s life in an extensive way since they are directly related to capital allocation 
choices.  
Assuming a world of scarce resources, the wrong choice in capital allocation 
enhances inefficiency and waste at the same time that constrains firms that 
promote productivity, support innovation and offer products and services that add 
value. An efficient resources allocation is therefore critical to a healthy and strong 
economy that can benefit society as a whole.   
The same goes to the security markets, right choices denies cost effective capital 
to companies that endorse unproductive practices and help superior companies 
granting credit. The difference is between a liquid and efficient market and one 
being constantly destabilized. 
To make these choices people need appropriate information so they can be able 
to judge the opportunities and risks of an investment. The collection, valuation and 
publishing of the information that has prospective importance regarding firms‘ 
current and future value are the main competences of a financial analyst. As a 
result it was established that financial analysts and the reports they create can by 
some means, represent and influence investors‘ beliefs and activities (Schipper, 
1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996).   
Even though these are simple and common understood ideas there are several 
academic studies concerning analysts‘ work, and though not always obvious 
expressed, the importance and legitimacy of what they do seems the underlying 
question constantly trying to be address.  
How can therefore we determine their value? Most academic literature and 
empirical research has been approaching this matter in two fundamental ways that 
we can describe as a Neo-Classic Approach and an Over-Socialized View. 
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1.1. The Neo-Classic Approach  
Financial analysts play a central role in security markets in interpreting and 
disseminating corporate financial and other information (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996), this idea summarizes what we can identify as a Neo-Classic Approach. By 
adopting an under-socialized view this approach argues that analysts‘ research 
can identify the real value of a security by dealing out with the available 
information (Savage, 1954), as a result we can see analysts playing an essential 
role in a semi-strong-form efficient market, as they collect, valuate and disclose 
information that has prospective importance regarding the firms‘ future value.    
Abnormal earnings can in theory be obtained since as Grossman et al. (1980) 
observed market price cannot perfectly reflect all available information, justifying 
therefore analysts‘ contribution and compensation. 
It seems therefore natural that the seminal studies in this area tried to determine 
market reactions to analysts‘ recommendations and whether investors can actually 
profit from the publicly available advices of security analysts. 
Early on in 1933 Alfred Cowles, an economist at Yale wrote a study titled, ―Can 
Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?‖ and concluded that investments 
recommendations did not add value. Today we know that the extraordinary period 
in which this research took place diminishes the impact of the results. 
Limited academic research was made in the following decades until the 70s, 
where the works by Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, and later 1984), Groth et al. 
(1979) suggested the opposite of Alfred Cowles findings by showing evidences of 
positive abnormal returns due to analysts‘ recommendations. 
The last three decades offered a mass volume of works regarding this theme, and 
most of them supported the idea of significant impact in the stock prices after 
analysts‘ (change in) recommendations suggesting their ability to select or 
influence stocks. 
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The world largest published stock advisory ranking - Value Line - allowed 
Holloway (1981 and 1983), to conclude that it incorporated valuable information 
and could lead to positive abnormal returns, given that ―rank 1‖ stocks (top rated 
stocks) outperformed the market, even after the deduction of transaction costs. A 
related conclusion was obtained by Stickel (1985) who proved that even though 
Value Line rank‘s changes affected common stock prices and consented modest 
return to investors in the first few days after the ―announcement‖ date, ―the ranking 
upgrades and downgrades were a response to large stock price movements 
previous to the change dates.‖ 
Substantial returns, close to 3.5%, were also detected in a similar study by Liu et 
al. (1990) when analyzing the recommendations on the ―New Street Journal‖ 
shown under the column ―Heard on the Street‖. For the column ―Dartboard‖, 
Barber and Loefler (1993), showed that the most highly recommended stocks 
earned a positive alpha of over 4% per year. 
The empirical research of Womack (1996) is seen as truly significant since major 
improvements were made in the database and in the benchmark techniques used 
in the research. Using a sample of 1573 recommendation changes by 14 of the 
biggest U.S. brokerage houses, Womack reported that the three-day 
recommendation period returns are large and in the direction forecast by the 
analyst whether or not they are coincidental with other corporate news. Thus, they 
have important perceived information content. The average return in changes to 
―buy‖, ―strong buy‖ or ―added to the recommended list‖ was 3%. This contrasts to 
new ―sell‖ recommendations where the average reaction was larger (–4.5%). 
Nevertheless Womack failed to prove an ideal efficient market reaction since the 
prices continue to drift for weeks or months in the direction of analyst 
recommendation. 
By means of recognizing accuracy in these studies it should be natural to admit 
the virtues of analysts‘ recommendations and therefore respond to our papers 
query. However one relevant question maintains – can analysts be portrayed as a 
homogeneous class? Stickel (1992) seemed to address this question negatively 
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by proving that some brokerage teams supplied more accurate earnings forecasts 
than other analysts, attesting therefore a positive relation between analyst‘s 
reputation and performance. 
Since 1997 it has been a habit that many brokerage houses and Investment Firms 
offer Price Target forecasts in addition to recommendations. Asquith et al (2003) 
reported interesting results, approximately 54% of analysts‘ Price Targets are 
achieved within 12 months and even if the target was missed, the average 
maximum (minimum) price observed for projected increases (decreases) was 84% 
of the Price Target. A different outcome came from the work by Bradshaw and 
Brown (2005) who found evidences of sustained ability to accurately forecast 
earnings but not Price Targets. 
Gleason et al (2006) extending Loh and Mian (2005) work, documented opposite 
results by finding a positive association between earnings estimate accuracy and 
Price Target accuracy, suggesting that there is a positive association between 
earnings forecast accuracy and the profitability of trading strategies. 
More recently Bonini et al (2009) work showed that Price Target forecasting 
accuracy is very limited, according to him prediction errors are consistent and 
analysts‘ research is systematically biased supporting past theoretical predictions 
made by Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006). 
It is clear that throughout these decades, several papers tried to measure the 
value of analysts‘ recommendations, and even though the overall result suggests 
some kind of ability in both stock selection and market timing, there are several 
contradictory results in all the literature. Moreover recent events (2008–2010 
financial crisis) will certainly add arguments to the impracticality of precise 
predictions in stock selection and pricing, and will show clearly the enormous 
importance of the market risk in the equity overall risk, and therefore the legitimacy 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumptions. 
In addition the research tools of these works have been also frequently subjected 
to criticism; the most common points to sample bias or imprecise data (Walker and 
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Hatfiel, 1996) and summarizes the difficulty for any empirical research apparatus 
to model the numerous amounts of variables that have influential power in 
determining the legitimacy and value of analysts. 
But perhaps the most powerful critic regarding analysts‘ importance goes beyond 
the technical consistency of their studies and undermines the basic tenet of 
classical economic theory by doubting that analysts‘ investment recommendations 
reflect their rationally formed expectations and are made using all available 
information in an efficient manner. 
1.2. The Over-Socialized View 
Potential deviations from the rational Neo-Classic economic literature have long 
been documented. Some authors assume their nature is induced and not 
intentional this approach is rooted in the economics of information cascades 
(Sushil et al., 1992) and in the sociological processes of mimetic isomorphism 
(Sushil et al., 1992; Rao et al, 2001). According to this neo-institutional approach 
analysts do not engage in deep calculative procedures they merely follow each 
other and reveal profound biased behavior in their actions. 
This herd conduct (mutual imitation) in the investment field had already been 
documented by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Welch (1999) who showed that 
analysts‘ recommendations are influenced by the recommendations of previous 
analysts and from prevailing consensus.  
More recently in a similar approach Rao el al (2007), found evidences that ―social 
proof - using the actions of others to infer the value of a course of action - creates 
information cascades in which decision makers initiate coverage of a firm when 
peers have recently begun coverage. Analysts that initiate coverage of a firm in 
the wake of a cascade are particularly prone to overestimating the firm's future 
profitability, and they are subsequently more likely than other analysts to abandon 
coverage of the firm.‖  
Other studies showed evidences of a more intentional biased behavior, linked with  
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analysts‘ concern for reputation - Hong et al. (2000) found that inexperienced 
analysts are more likely to be ill judged for inaccurate earnings forecasts than are 
their more experienced counterparts leading them to ―deviate less from consensus 
forecasts‖. This reputation effect can also explain why analysts release their 
forecast figures close to prior earnings expectations even against their own private 
information, a ―play safe‖ behavior that was detected by Trueman (1994). 
Apparently the lack of neutrality is well spread, proofs of a favoritism conduct were 
found even when choosing the stocks to follow Jegadeesh et al (2002) 
documented that analysts tend to prefer growth stocks with ―glamour‖ (i.e., positive 
momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) characteristics. 
It comes with no surprise that analysts‘ recommendations tend to be over-
optimistic when evaluating stocks according to Rajan and Servaes (1997) and that 
this conduct is more noticeable when the brokerage house has investment 
banking relations to the firm that is analyzed (Michaely and Womack, 1999). It is 
difficult to see this finding as remarkable since a major portion of the analysts‘ 
payment comes from their ability to generate revenues to the corporate financial 
arm of the investment bank. 
However the most documented and the most effective evidence of a bias conduct 
can be found in analysts‘ buy-to-sell recommendations ratio, 10 to 1 up to the early 
1990s (Pratt 1993); Womack (1996) points to 7 to 1. 
The explanation is simple according to Phillips and Zuckerman (2001), analysts 
are themselves evaluated ―by the same companies they follow‖. ―Sell‖ 
recommendations will make the later confine access to information in an effort to 
avoid negative reviews. In this environment an inclination to engage in dubious 
acts can therefore be powerful. Results from a recent inquiry (CMVM, 2002) into 
Portuguese Investment Firms analysts revealed difficulties in accessing 
companies‘ information after a recommendation seen as adverse.  
As we have seen until now the overall academic literature as treated analysts in 
two distinct ways: as rational calculators delivering updated information to the 
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market assuming a Neo-Classic economic approach and as irrational agents  
following each other and engaging in dubious conducts in a Neo-Institutional 
sociologist perception. 
Our work questions if any of these perspectives is able to capture the importance 
of analysts‘ work. Moreover we consider that a contradiction issue ascends from 
them: if the herd behavior is refuted, we are admitting that analysts tend to have 
different opinions and therefore we recognize in a paradoxical way the 
impossibility to treat them us a homogeneous group that allows a consistency 
study. In other words how can we evaluate an investment strategy that is built 
around analyst opinions if their opinions are inherently dissimilar? How can 
anyone profit from an analysts‘ recommendations strategy if they differ in their 
evaluations? Coelho (2003) looking at the Portuguese stock market found that 
different reports for the same company, issued in the same day have an average 
gap between the Price Targets of 12%, this value ascends to 21%  when there is a 
10 days gap. 
It seems therefore natural that some authors tried to escape this dualistic 
perspective (Neo-Classic vs. Neo-Institutional) about the role analysts have in the 
financial markets by proposing a new approach - the Framework View. 
1.3. The Framework View 
At this moment we can summarize academic research that aims to describe the 
importance of financial analysts in two categories, a) attempts to capture and 
understand the effects of their work by modeled neo-classic structures and b) a 
constant unveiling of exogenous variables that cannot be portrayed by these 
models. 
Beunza and Garud (2005) work acknowledging the narrow limits of both 
perspectives and the impossibility to combine them (as they are inherent 
contradictory), proposed a different approach. 
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By recognizing that none of these theories can fully explain the most important 
value that institutional investors assume to get from the work of analysts (access 
to industry knowledge and written reports, according to fund managers‘ opinion 
surveys1) this paper proposed that analysts should be seen as frame-workers 
builders, following the work by Goffman (1974). Frames can be seen as cognitive 
tools that organize reality and direct action, in the words of Kuypers (2009) they 
―induce us to filter our perceptions of the world in particular ways, essentially 
making some aspects of our multi-dimensional reality more noticeable than other 
aspects. They operate by making some information more salient than other 
information.‖ 
Carrying this view into the context of the stock market  ―a map or frame helps  
categorize a firm and places it within a larger industry context including its 
competitors, collaborators, potential entrants and its customers.‖, Daniel Beunza 
and Raghu Garud (2005). 
Pursuing this approach we can see analyst generate value by providing a road 
map, in other words a conceptual structure that can help their clients to 
understand a company and access their potential value, or us Tsao (2002) sees it, 
―In the end, stock ratings and target prices are just the skin and bones of analysts‘ 
research. The meat of such reports is in the analysis, detail, and tone. Investors 
who are willing to spend the time can easily figure out what an analyst really thinks 
about a stock by reading a research report.‖ 
Our work departs from this assumption that analysts are indeed best portrayed 
and best valued as frame-workers and that the ability to establish a common 
space of understanding with their clients is linked with the quantity and quality of 
the information provided. Information helps investors build frames and those 
mental maps help them feel more comfortable with their actions. For this reason 
                                                          
1
 Institutional Investor surveys more than 3,400 institutional investors annually. The major found is that investors 
consistently rank industry knowledge and written magazine reports as the more important attributes from analysts 
work, more  than stock selections and earnings estimates (see “What Investors Really Want”, Institutional Investor 
1998-2009, Appendix A).  
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analysts can play an important intermediary function in the financial markets by 
providing enlightening reports (we remind that industry knowledge was the most 
voted aspect taken from analysts work), that more than offering recommendations 
about whether to sell or buy a stock they help investors knowing a company and 
evaluating2 by themselves. We can conclude that a precondition for reports clients 
to establish frames and evaluation conclusions, is that a wide set of information is 
provided.  
The main point from which departs our research can now be captured and 
summarized in the following research propositions: 
#1Frame-works are cognitive tools that allow investors to act. 
#2 Information allows investors to create frame-works. 
#3 Analysts are important if they provide the information reports users need 
to build frameworks. 
In this line of thought we will examine the content of analyst written reports (in the 
PSI20 context) trying to determine if Portuguese analysts can provide the 
information users need and at the same time we will scrutinize the calculation 
apparatus they use to determine the Price Targets, by doing so we hope to offer 
significant elements to evaluate analysts‘ works importance, virtues and faults. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
prior research regarding the content of sell-side analysts‘ reports and the methods 
they use to evaluate companies. We then set the theoretical framework of this 
work and the methodology used in our empirical research. In the following section, 
we describe the sample used and report some summary descriptive statistics from 
                                                          
2
  For the purpose if this work we assume that to evaluate investors need to engage in calculate procedures, and 
calculation is a process of associations (Callon 1998). Value is therefore identified only by a preliminary categorization 
followed by the use of specific metrics that allow comparison. Hence, first investors try to acknowledge the class of the 
company (i.e. in each group it fits) and next they apply particular valuation measures that are built-in according to that 
category.  
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it. In section 5 we discuss our empirical results and last section summarizes 
conclusions and the main contributions of this paper to the existing literature. 
 
2. Prior Research 
2.1. Information Aptitude 
Information in sell-side analysts‘ reports has been the subject of several academic 
works, mainly in two distinct approaches: a) the data analysts use (inputs) to 
produce the reports and the information provided (outputs) by them and b) the 
information that should be provided to reports‘ users. 
Regarding the first approach and considering these reports represent the final 
output of analysts‘ work and illustrates their firms‘ value beliefs it seems natural 
the use of quantity data to build them, Horngren (1978) showed evidences that the 
annual report is the most important source of information to analysts, and that the 
firms‘ income statement is the most important component they use. A similar 
conclusion came from Chang and Most (1985), according to their research U.S. 
analysts rank the income statement the balance sheet, and the statement of 
changes in financial position as the most important parts of the annual report. 
In more recent times and perhaps as result of the rapid changes affecting 
businesses and the increasing relevance given to intangible assets and human 
capital, several academic studies allow us to believe that a different trend is 
growing. Recently Rogers and Grant (1997) reported that ―financial statements 
provide only one-quarter (26%) of the information cited by analysts‖ and that ―the 
MD&A (Management Discussion and Analysis) section of the annual report is an 
extremely important section in terms of the information cited‖ in these reports. 
This view is shared by the work of Dempsey et al (1997) that brought some 
interesting conclusions regarding the information that analysts use. These authors 
using a balanced scorecard framework created a list of sixty-three financial and 
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non-financial key performance indicators, they then surveyed a number of sell-side 
financial analysts by questionnaire. The analysts were asked how frequently they 
used each indicator when trying to forecast the firms‘ future performance. The 
major finding was that financial analysts to a great degree identify the value of 
strategic indicators measures ―to assess long-term financial success of 
companies.‖ 
This behavior in which analysts rely on information that is well beyond the 
conventional financial data, and extensively consider non-financial information 
(company‘s risks, quality of the management and strategy, competitive position 
etc) was also identified by Previts et al (1994) in their 479 sell-side analysts‘ 
reports  content analysis. The conclusion of Breton and Taffler (2001) that analyst 
see information about firm‘s management and strategy as main drivers to their 
‗buy‘,  ‗sell‘, and ‗hold‘  recommendations, should therefore come with no surprise. 
Abdolmohammadi et al. (2006) deepened this subject and by classifying their 
sample in two different industries, intangible asset intensive industries (which 
included ―Internet‖ and ―Telecommunications and Network Equipment‖) and  
tangible asset intensive industries (which included ―Auto  Manufacturing  and  Auto  
Parts‖ and ―Textile and Apparel‖) found that analysts following firms in the first 
group used a higher proportion of non-financial data and a lower proportion of  
financial data than analysts following firms in the second. This allowed the 
conclusion that the growth scenario of the industry can determine the information 
that analysts use. 
It is clear that analysts rely in a wide variety of information to build their reports, 
ranging from the more conventional data such as the financial statements to pure 
intangible data; and since the main objective of analysts‘ reports is to provide 
investors with information that is helpful in deciding whether and at what price to 
assign, or continue to assign, resources to a particular company, one important 
question emerges – is there a perfect report that can fulfill this objective? 
Suggestions that financial reports fail to attend this gold are not new (Lee and 
Tweedie 1977, 1981, 1990; Rimerman 1990). 
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In the past years a large number of institutions and researchers have been 
committed to generate a debate to determine the needs of the users of financial 
reports and the best way to address them. This debate acknowledges that 
business report cannot be unaffected by the rapid changes affecting companies. 
New business environment and practices seems to need new ways of measuring 
the performance and new kinds of information on which the management can rely. 
The reports apparatus must therefore keep up with the shifting needs of the 
reports users. 
The Special Committee on Financial Reporting, aka Jenkins Report, (AICPA 1994) 
is considered a crucial effort in improving the utility in business report. By 
acknowledging the fundamental changes affecting business environments the 
Committee's work objective is ―analogous to the product and service redesign 
undertaken by many successful businesses to meet customer needs better.‖ 
Overall ―the Committee undertook a comprehensive study to determine the 
information needs of users and to identify the types of information most useful in 
predicting earnings and cash flows for the purpose of valuing equity securities.‖ 
It is generally established that the world is eager for information; this study accepts 
this fact and recognizes ―that users have a wide … insatiable appetites for 
information. When asked, users frequently say they want all possible information‖. 
Again we acknowledge the Jenkins Report as the state of art in this field of 
research, by making clear, what kind of information is in fact important and used in 
the decision making process. Three techniques were used to distinguish between 
the types of information that are needed and the types that are interesting but not 
essential: 
 First, the Committee developed a framework of information needs based on 
how investors value companies and how creditors assess the prospect of 
repayment. It considered information consistent with and central to the 
framework to be more important and other information less important.  
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 Second, the study sought data about the relative priority users place on 
different kinds of information, which helped the Committee rank potential 
improvements in business reporting.  
 Third, the study sought data indicating the percentage of users that believe 
in one idea or another. Areas with the highest support suggested more 
important information.  (extracts from the Jenkins Report) 
After distinguish between needed information and nonessential information this 
study developed eight projects that together provided the truly essential 
information users need: 
1) Study and analysis of documents written by users or based on research directly 
with them about their needs for information.   
2) Analysis of business and investment models. 
3) Meetings with the Committee's investor and creditor discussion groups. 
4) Meetings with (a) the Financial Accounting Policy Committee of the Association 
of Investment Management and Research (AIMR), a group that represents 
portfolio managers and analysts, and (b) the RMA Accounting Policy Committee. 
5) Meetings with other investors, creditors, and advisors. 
6) Research sponsored by the Committee about the types of information included 
in analysts' published reports about companies. 
7) Research sponsored by the Committee about information supplied voluntarily to 
users in addition to that required in business reports. 
8) Survey of users about their information needs. 
In this effort to improve business reporting the Committee offered key points that 
should be capture, for all intents and purposes reports must ―focus more on factors 
that create longer term value, including nonfinancial measures indicating how key 
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processes are performing‖ and must ―better align information reported externally 
with the information reported to senior management to manage the business‖. In 
addition it is essentially they provide ―more information with a forward-looking 
perspective, including management's plans, opportunities, risks, and measurement 
uncertainties‖. 
In 2001 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) work: Improving 
Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures (2001) a 
follow-on to the work of the AICPA also recognized that ―traditional financial 
statements do not capture — and may not be able to capture — the value drivers 
that dominate the new economy‖. This work was focused in the study of voluntary 
disclosures of business information and the main objective was to ensure and 
―explore(s) some possible approaches that might improve business and financial 
reporting‖. The outcome was pursued by providing evidences ―that many leading 
companies are making extensive voluntary disclosures and by listing examples of 
those disclosures.‖ 
These examples were extensive valuable to our own research by permitting a 
precise illustration and description of the information categories the users of 
reports need. 
A close and detailed reading of these two works allows us to summarize their final 
conclusions, to meet users' changing needs, business reporting must provide:   
 Financial Statements elements. 
 More information with a forward-looking perspective, including 
management's plans, opportunities, risks, and measurement uncertainties.   
 Focus more on the factors that create Long Term Value, including non-
financial measures indicating how key business processes are performing.3   
                                                          
3
 While companies struggle to accomplish financial survival and success, industries are meanwhile reshaping to create 
the new winners and losers, the ability to set targets and action to ensure long term sustainability is the idea behind 
Long Term Value Creators Category which will be coded accordingly. 
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 Business data (for example, high-level operating data and performance 
measurements that management uses to manage the business). 
 Management's analysis of business data (for example, reasons for changes 
in the operating and performance-related data, and the identity and past 
effect of key trends). 
 Management's perspective. Many users want to see a company through the 
eyes of its management to help them understand management's perspective 
and predict where management will lead the company.  
 Separately reporting on each business segment of a company's business 
having diverse opportunities and risks. Segment information provides 
additional insight into the opportunities and risks of investments and 
sharpens predictions.  
 Background about the company (for example, broad objectives and 
strategies, Mission and Values, scope and description of business, products, 
costumers etc.). 
 Information about management and shareholders (for example, directors, 
management, compensation, major shareholders, and transactions and 
relationships among related parties). 
 The relative reliability of information in business reporting. Users need to be 
able to distinguish between information that is highly reliable and that which 
is less reliable.  
 A focus on measurement to help users understand a company's 
performance relative to that of competitors and other companies. While 
descriptions of business events are important, numbers are important too. 
Management should disclose the measurements it uses in managing the 
business that quantify the effects of key activities and events.  
 Information about human capital and intangible assets that have not been 
recognized in the financial statements. 
This last point, the importance of human capital and intangible assets, is only 
mentioned in the FASB work, according to them ―intangible assets are considered 
to be of increasing importance to companies and investors today‖, and 
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nevertheless the difficulties in valuing them, there seem to be no doubts regarding 
the importance of their presence in business reporting. Our paper shares this idea 
which is also shared in Blair and Wallman (2001) and Upton (2001) extensive 
work. 
As previously stated we consider that analyst importance is connected with their 
ability to satisfy reports users. These two seminal works will be the departing point 
for our empirical research concerning the information aptitude (deliver ability) in 
the content of sell-side analysts‘ reports. Our choice recognizes therefore the main 
focus, both these works have on clients needs, and also acknowledge the wide 
scope of agreement these studies have on the information categories that are 
considered vital to capital allocation choices. Also acknowledged is the focus of 
both works on users that follow fundamental approaches; this is of extreme 
importance since our research is centered in analyst financial reports and not all 
users rely on them when making their capital allocations on the stock markets 
(technical investors feet perfectly in this category). 
It is also important to mention that even thought the focus of the Jenkins Report 
research was on the information companies should provide to meet investors and 
creditors needs the conclusions can be shared with other types of business 
reporting - especially sell-side financial analysts‘ reports who as previously stated 
are largely driven by companies financial reporting and are for that reason seen as 
a strong proxy to corporate disclosures. 
Moreover, it can be strongly argued that since both instruments of report aim for 
similar users and share identical proposes their readers‘ needs can be considered 
as identical.  
2.2. Valuation Models 
Users of reports and investors in general rely on sell-side financial analysts‘ views 
when forming opinions about the absolute and relative value of the companies 
they follow. Analysts can use a large variety of approaches to value them: 
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 Apply a multiple to the company's current or projected earnings, 
cash flows, or adjusted reported equity.  
 Project the company's future cash flows and residual value and 
discount at a risk-adjusted cost of capital.  
 Add to or subtract the estimated current or fair values of non-
operating resources or obligations from the present value of future 
core earnings or cash flows.  
 Total current or fair values of the company's major assets, and 
subtract the current or fair value of the company's debt.  
 Identify recent favorable or unfavorable developments that are not 
yet reflected in the market price.  
 Identify probable short-term price changes through indicators 
involving financial measurements, such as the momentum in the 
company's earnings.  
The first four approaches can be seen as fundamental analysis and the last two as 
technical analysis. These are the two main schools of thought regarding the 
evaluation of stocks. Fundamental analysis departs from a firm's financial 
statements and from the surrounding economical environment and tries to 
determine the intrinsic value of a stock. On the other hand, technical traders 
departing from an efficient market hypothesis believe there is no reason to analyze 
a company's fundamentals because they are all accounted for in the stock's price. 
Technical analysts does not attempt to measure a security's intrinsic value but 
instead uses stock past charts to identify patterns and trends that may suggest 
what a stock will do in the future. Arnold and Moizer (1984) found even so that this 
method is far less perceived useful to analysts, and that they strongly rely on 
fundamental analysis for appraising stock. Their survey found that fundamental 
analysis was ―usually‖ or ―almost always‖ used in 96% of the times by analysts.  
Within fundamental analysis there are also a large variety of techniques to 
evaluate stocks, the main alternative is between methods that apply multiples and 
methods that involve future payoffs and therefore the use of forecasts (multi period 
methods). 
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It has been argued that looking at accounting earnings capitalized by a P/E4 ratio 
(a multiple method) is a static approach to evaluate a firm, and that share 
valuation should be supported on forecast discounted cash-flows (CFD), this 
technique though respected by financial theorists is not frequently used according 
again to Arnold et al. (1984).  
 
Barker (1999) fifteen years later also argued that this alleged theoretical 
superiority of multi period valuation models finds no support in evaluation practice, 
according to him analysts and fund managers ―show a preference for 
'unsophisticated' valuation (methods) using, for example, the dividend yield rather 
than the dividend discount model‖ and both groups rank the PE model and the 
dividend yield model as the most important, and both groups rate the DCF and 
dividend discount models as unimportant‖. This reported use of profitable 
measures to evaluate stocks justifies the conclusion drawn by Previts et al (1994) 
research; according to them analysts base their recommendations primarily on an 
evaluation of company income, relative to balance sheet or cash flow evaluations.  
 
Bradshaw, M. (2002) looked deeper and found, in a sample of 103 U.S. analysts 
reports, that the most favorable recommendations (and Price Targets) have a 
higher probability to be justified by price-earnings ratios and expected growth while 
the least favorable recommendations are more likely to be justified with other 
qualitative.  
 
More recently Asquith P. et al (2005), investigated a sample of 1.126 complete 
analysts‘ reports written by 56 unique sell-side analysts from 11 different 
investment banks covering 46 industries, and corroborated that ―most analysts use 
a simple earnings multiple valuation model. Only a minority use Net Present Value 
or other discounted cash flow approaches favored by finance textbooks and MBA 
curriculums.‖ Still in accordance to their work, ―99.1% of analysts mention they use 
some sort of earnings multiple‖ and ―only 12.8% of analysts report using any 
variation of discounted cash flow in computing their price targets‖.  
                                                          
4
 P/E or PER (Price-to-Earnings Ratio) = Price Per Share / Annual Earnings Per Share 
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It is commonly assumed that analysts are increasingly paying more attention to 
quality data. We believe that consequently this trend should be identified in the 
methods used to evaluate stocks. The idea is simple if analysts rely more on 
accounting information they should provide a present value analysis approach, by 
the other hand a gradually use of non financial data should lead to a higher 
forecast ability and therefore allow the use of multi period methods of evaluation. 
It is possible to recognize some signs of this trend, Demirakos et al (2004) for the 
UK, when studying the valuation methodologies contained in 104 analysts' reports, 
found that ―analysts typically choose either a PE model or an explicit multi period 
DCF valuation model as their dominant valuation model‖. Also Bradshaw (2002) 
reported new price-multiple heuristics recently being used by analysts – such as 
the PEG*5, which is equal to the P/E ratio divided by the expected earnings growth 
rate (Asquith research pointed only to 1% of the analysts using this method).  
A common use of multi period models was already detected by Block (1999), who  
tried to determine the methods analysts use by an interview approach using a 
sample of 297 responses by analysts‘ memberships of AMIR (Association for 
Investment management and Research). The main findings were that analysts 
consider earnings and cash-flows to be more important than book value and 
dividends and that the EVA™6, also a multi period evaluation approach, is the most 
used (when confronted with the dividend discounted model and the capital assets 
pricing model). This finding supported also prior survey based research from Pike 
et al (1993) for the U.K. and Germany markets. 
At this moment it is possible to concede that even though multi-period discounted 
cash-flows and residual value methods have a recognized academic authority 
(Penman, 2001; Copeland et al., 2000 and Palepu et al., 2000), analysts have 
been making their valuation estimations based more frequently in multiple 
methods (Barker, 1999; Arnold et al., 1984; Pike et al., 1993; and Block, 1999).  
More recent works allows us to believe that analysts continue to choose as the 
                                                          
5
 PEG (Price/Earnings To Growth ratio) = PER / Annual EPS Growth 
6
 EVA (Economic Value Added) is Net Operating Profit After Taxes (or NOPAT) less the money cost of capital 
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―prevalent‖ model the PE approach but are gradually using more frequently DCF 
models and more ―exotic‖ methods in their work. Moreover Demirakos et al (2004) 
found evidences that analysts use tailored evaluation methods according to the 
firm‘s sector circumstances. 
Remarkable and puzzling are Cavezzali (2007) conclusions, her empirical study 
on the content of reports from Italian stock market reported that in about 70% of 
the reports it was not possible to understand clearly the evaluation method used. 
However the impact of this result is somehow diminish by Asquith et al (2005) 
findings that no correlation exists between valuation methodology and either 
analysts accuracy or the market‘s reaction to a report.  
In the spirit of our work we believe Cavezzali finding to be of extreme importance. 
Well-organized financial markets should promote well-organized information; 
therefore analysts‘ importance should be linked to the ability to issue clear 
information. Caring in mind that we can only judge the merits of things that can be 
identified, our work will evaluate if analysts make clear the model they use to 
evaluate the companies and additionally we will examine if the calculative 
procedure is correct (meaning differences between valuation theories and 
valuation practices used).  
 
 
3. The Methodology  
Given the absence of an earlier theory and the lack of previous information around 
the subject of this work our general approach was an inductive one. This meaning 
we moved from the specific to the general, so that particular occurrences could be 
observed and then combined into a larger description or general statement. In 
other words we gathered and examined data in search for patterns that consent 
the development of conclusions; by doing so we diverged from a cause/effect 
analysis of the phenomena and focused on a more descriptive approach. Our 
choice was reinforced by the fact that this is the first paper regarding this theme for 
 29 
 
the Portuguese Stock Market, we therefore moved with extra care and tried to 
avoid the common error of mistaking causality with coincidence. 
As mentioned before, the main research objects of our work are financial analysts‘ 
reports, these sources of information although being one of several means of 
communication used by analysts are nevertheless ―the only extensive trace of the 
analyst's work‖ (Breton et al 2001), their examination emerges as the best way to 
reach our objective. Portuguese reports were therefore explored in two different 
ways: 
 
a) by evaluating their ability to deliver the information reports users need, 
 
b) by exploring the methods analysts use to evaluate firms and if those 
procedures are clear and if the calculative apparatus is truthful. 
 
3.1. Information Aptitude 
Regarding our first purpose we used content analysis as our methodology, here 
defined as a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid 
inferences from text (Weber 1990). Although this method is not perfectly design to 
offer statistical and calculative results it is nevertheless fitted for our aim - textural 
investigation in a context of rich data and complex information substance. 
Moreover this methodology is principally suitable because of its unobtrusive nature 
in analyzing narratives and information (Krippendorff, K. 1980). Content analysis 
has also the advantage of allowing a focus on analysts‘ reports, the concrete 
substance of analysts‘ works, and therefore eliminates the possibility of dubious 
interpretations, such is the case with direct interviews and questionnaires, where 
analysts‘ responses may be self-serving and fail to supply real insight into what 
they actually do in practice.  
There are numerous works that use content analysis methodologies in accounting 
and financial reporting areas. Jones and Shoemaker (1994) mentioned an amount 
of 35 studies, between analysis made on annual reports, legal texts, letters of 
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comment, standards and training manuals, government reports and testimonies 
before commissions.  
More recently the work by Smith and Taffler (2000) selected this methodology to 
examine if the firm's discretionary narrative disclosures measured its financial risk 
and found ―that the chairman‘s statement is highly predictive of firm failure‖. In a 
close study, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) adopted a word-based content analytic 
approach focused only in negative references and their consequences in the 
company‘s performance. 
Looking strictly to the content study of sell side analysts‘ reports, there have been 
a large number of techniques being used by researchers, the most common is to 
use disclosure indexes this is the case of two recent studies (Orens and Lybaert, 
2004; Arvidsson, 2003) that compared the content of sell-side analysts‘ reports to 
the firms‘ annual reports. Already in 1997 Roger and Grant tried to access ―the 
relevance of information provided in the annual report by investigating a sample of 
187 sell-side analyst reports‖. 
Related procedures have also been conducted with the objective of examine the 
use of indicators of intellectual capital (Flostrand, 2006; Arvidsson, 2003 and 
Abhayawansa S., 2009 ) and the use of non-financial information in the context of 
analysts‘ reports (Fogarty  and  Rogers,  2005; Previts et al, 1994). 
Commonly the extent of disclosure (i.e. quantity) has been used as a proxy to the 
quality of disclosure, but the increasing use of this technique has always been 
accompanied by an intense debate regarding this measurement of quality. Many 
have argued that for the purpose of inference, frequency is not necessarily related 
to the importance of assertion, in other words quantity cannot be the only measure 
of quality and therefore results must rely on a more adequate evaluation (Beattie 
et al, (2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004). 
Though we will return to this subject later (well expressed and long reviewed in 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008 work), it is possible to indentify, in the seminal 
research of Govindarajan (1980) regarding the types of information (cash-flow vs. 
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earnings) used to justify recommendations, an attempt to escape this conflict by 
using ―a combination of counting the frequency of occurrence and the researcher‘s 
subjective assessments‖ when making inferences form the text.  
Since the early 80s with the dissemination of computers the use of automated 
content analysis software has widespread. Normally data from manual content 
analysis is taken in a hard and labor intense process limiting the sample size. 
Computers software has been a resourceful tool, it adds coherence and quickness 
to the all process, and has been used in several studies (Smith and Taffler, 2000; 
Roger and Grant, 1997; Breton and Taffler, 2001; Abrahamson and Amir, 1996). 
The impossibility of an artificial replication of the human knowledge, i.e. not only 
syntax but also semantic control (Searle, 1980), summarizes the obvious 
limitations of these tools. An interesting approach to deal with manually and 
automatically restrictions has been to use both techniques (Hussainey and Walker, 
2008). 
The several techniques described here adds truth to Satu and  Kyngas (2007) 
words that ―the challenge regarding content analysis is the fact that it is very 
flexible and there is no simple, ‗right‘ way of doing it‖ and justifies Weber‘s (1990) 
conclusion that researchers must evaluate what research apparatus is most 
appropriate for their particular problems. 
Our content analysis methodology can be seen as a Discourse Analysis, in the 
words of Neuendorf (2002) a process that ―engages in characteristics of manifest 
language and word use…through consistency and connection of words to theme 
analysis of content and the establishment of central terms.‖ Our proposal was to 
make a deep and complete reading of the financial analysts‘ reports in search for 
words in sentences (recording units) that can connect to categories (information 
units) that have a recognized importance for reports users, allowing therefore an 
evaluation of the reports information ability.   
All our data was taken directly from analysts‘ reports in a hand code process, by 
using a non-computer reading of the texts and allowing a multi-words meaning 
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analysis we hope to provide a more wide-range and content detailed analysis than 
single-words researches like Previts et al. (1994). Also our examination of context 
allows specific classification of information and avoids relying on archetypal 
significances. For example, the word "property" seems always in reference to a 
balance sheet assets (a land), but it might appear in an intellectual, brand/ patent 
discussion. 
We already seen that investors strongly rely on sell-side financial analysts‘  
forecasts when making their investment decisions (Clement  and  Tse,  2003), and 
they also see financial analysts reports as a proxy to business reports, bearing this 
in mind we will confront our sample results against an ideal business report. 
As previous stated we acknowledged the major contribution of both, the Jenkins 
Report (AICPA, 1994) and the Improving Business Reporting: Insights into 
Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures (FASB, 2001), in determining users‘ needs for 
information and consequently the ideal report. The conclusions of these reports 
combined with the examination of a pre-sample were the departing point for 
stabling our categories.  
The use of these authoritative reports for determining the kind of information users 
need and therefore build a framework that allows an analysts‘ reports content 
analysis is not new. For this reason our empirical research has resemblances with 
the work made by Nielsen (2008), her extended review of 5 authoritative reports 
within the business-reporting debate, like ours, offers agreement on several 
themes who bear information perceived as important to reports users. The 
categories elected cover a wide range of information from the conventional 
financial and accounting data to more exploratory and forecasting oriented ones.  
Given that we also recognize the enormous changes affecting business and the 
increasingly importance of ―Intangible assets‖ as value driver for the economical 
growth (Blair & Wallman), we added an ―Intangible Assets / Intellectual Capital‖ 
category to our framework, despite the fact that this category is only stated in the 
FASB Report. 
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A content financial report prototype that can be seen as ideal should bear 
information regarding the categories synthesized in table a. 
Table 1 - Proposed Business-Reporting Categories 
Categories JR FASB 
1 Maps and financial statements X  
2 Financial data X X 
3 Management’s operating data X X 
4 Management’s analysis   X X 
5 Risks and opportunities X X 
6 Long term value creators X X 
7 Background information X X 
8 Comparable measures X  
9 Segment information X  
10 Corporate governance / Information about shareholders X X 
11 Intellectual capital / Intangible assets  X 
12 Analysts analysis / opinion X  
In order to provide a common ground of understanding Table 2 reviews the most 
important of these categories by reproducing the ideas exposed in the Jenkins 
Reports and the examples given by the Improving Business Reporting: Insights 
into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures (FASB, 2001). 
Table 2 - Categories Review 
Categories Jenkins Report FASB 
Management’s 
operating data 
―High-level operating data and performance 
measurements that management uses to 
manage the business‖ 
 Plant capacities by product, including 
the past year’s additions to those 
capacities and the additions scheduled 
for the upcoming year. 
 Details of growth in market share in all 
major regions and countries. 
Management’s 
analysis 
―Users seek management's perspective about 
the businesses it manages for three reasons. 
First, management is closest to the businesses 
and therefore often the best source for company- 
specific information. Second, management 
influences a company's future direction. Thus, 
understanding management's vision for the 
company and its plans for the future provides 
users with a valuable leading indicator of where 
management will lead a company. Third, 
management's perspective provides users with 
valuable information to evaluate the quality of 
management, which also may be a leading 
indicator of the company's future performance.‖ 
 Supplemental quarterly analysis of 
volume, price, and cost trends by 
segment 
 Explanation that the increase in gross 
margin results from cost declines and 
changes in the product mix. 
Risks and 
opportunities 
―opportunities and risks, including those resulting 
from key trends‖ 
―considerable insight into a company's 
opportunities and risks, including growth and 
market acceptance, costs, productivity, 
profitability, liquidity, collateral, and many 
others.‖ 
 Discussion of the risk of foreign 
currency exchange rate fluctuations on 
sales and profitability 
 An in-depth discussion of the key 
business risks facing the company. 
 34 
 
Long term value 
creators 
―Adopting a longer term focus by developing a 
vision of the future business environment. 
Provide users with a longer term focus about the 
activities that build shareholder value and protect 
creditors.‖ 
 Description of the company’s long-term 
performance objectives. 
 Identification of the company’s 
innovation goals 
Background 
information 
―Reporting under the model would include 
information about a company's broad objectives 
and business strategy.‖ 
―The nature of a business refers to the types of 
products or services offered, the methods of 
producing or delivering those products or 
services, the number and types of suppliers and 
customers, the locations of facilities and 
markets, and other factors that describe the 
activities of a business.‖ 
 Discussion of the company’s vision and 
values.  
 Detailed summary of the company’s 
history and major milestones. 
 
Comparable 
measures  
―Users do not evaluate a company in a vacuum. 
Rather, they usually evaluate several companies 
at once. Users usually are deciding about which 
of a myriad of companies in which to invest — 
their investment options rarely are restricted to a 
single company. Further comparing companies, 
particularly competitors, is useful in assessing 
relative strengths and weaknesses.‖ 
 Market position for manufacturing and 
marketing personal computers in the 
United States and worldwide 
 Percentage return on invested capital 
compared with that of the industry. 
 Performance (benchmarked against 
many of the company’s peer 
companies) for revenue growth, 
earnings growth, cash flow, ROE, and 
total shareholder return. 
 Comparison of product growth rates 
with those of the industry 
 Comparison of selected benchmarking 
data 
 Identification of competitors and product 
category market shares 
Segment 
information 
―For users analyzing a company …information 
about business segments often is as important 
as information about the company as a whole.‖ 
―There are many bases on which to segment a 
company's activities. They include industry, 
product lines, individual products, legal entities 
within a company, geographic based on where a 
company produces products or delivers services, 
geographic based on where a company sells its 
products or services, and others‖.  
 Graph displaying breakdown of sales by 
distribution method, for example, 
deliverable liquids and packaged 
products, and sales by 
markets/industries served. 
 Quarterly changes in physical volume of 
product by business group and by 
geographic location of customer, 
expressed as percentages. 
Corporate 
governance  / 
Information 
about 
shareholders 
―they find information in the following categories 
useful: Identity and background of directors and 
executive management; the types and amount of 
director and executive compensation…; 
transactions and relationships among major 
shareholders,     directors, management, 
suppliers, customers, competitors, and   the 
company management compensation.‖ 
 Disclosure of principal stockholders 
and creditors by name. 
 Composition of individual and 
institutional shareholders by 
percentage of ownership. 
Intellectual 
capital / 
Intangible 
assets* 
N/A 
 Patent history disclosing patent 
applications and awards for a subsidiary 
that manufactures parts. 
 Description of new research and 
development programs to reduce fuel 
consumption and to improve the 
recyclability of materials. 
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An essential idea in content analysis is that numerous words of the text can be 
classified into fewer categories (Weber 1990). The next step we have taken was to 
group together several concepts/words that are directly connected to our 
categories (Table 3), this procedure will create a set of sub-categories. For this 
purpose we extended Christina Nielsen (2008) codification framework by adding 
new words and vocabulary, this enlargement results essentially from our pre-
sample research.   
Table 3 – Codification Tags – Categories and Sub-Categories  
1 Financial Statements & Tables 6 Long Term Value Creators 
A Balance Sheet A Excellence  /  Innovation  /  Company Specific 
B Income Statement B Other 
C Cash-Flow  7 Background Information 
D Segmented A Objectives / Strategy 
E Share Performance / Holders & Stock Data B Vision / Mission 
F Key Financials C General Development Of The Business 
G Estimates D Products  
H Valuation E Industry / Markets 
I Comparables  F Processes 
J Other G Customers / Clients 
2 Financial Data  H Competitors 
A Turnover / Revenues I Properties 
B Margins J External Regulation / Legal Conditions 
C EBITDA / Operational Cash Flow L Other 
D Capital expenditure / Investment      8 Comparable Measures 
E Debt  / Financial Costs A Financial and Operating  Data 
F Dividends   B Other Comparisons Across Peers and Competitors 
G D&M C Stock Performance  / Company Valuation 
H Gearing D Other 
I Interest Cover  9 Segment information 
J Properties  (Sale) A Industry / Market /Geography / Products  
L Profit and Profitability Measures   B Other 
M Provision 10 Corporate governance 
N Tax   A Board Structure and Assignments 
O Currency  B Division of Power Between Board and Management 
P Working Capital / Opex C Governance in General  
Q Other D Shareholders / Stakes 
3 Management´s Operational Data E Transactions and Relationships Among Related Parties 
A Costs F Other  
B Growth Drivers / Value Drivers  11 Intellectual capital / Intangible Assets 
C Products / Productivity /Capacity /Volumes / Stores A Employees 
D Sales / Market Share / Orders /Demand/ Prices B Core Competences 
E Other C Core Knowledge and Technology 
4 Management’s Analysis D Organizational, Structural & Relational Capital 
A Financial Data  E Patents  / Brands 
B Management Operating Data F Other 
C Macroeconomic Trends 12 Analysts Analysis  
D Market Changes / Momentum A Financial Information 
E Forward-Looking Information  B Management Operating Information 
F Other External Trends Affecting  the Company C Macroeconomic Trends 
G Management's Plans/ Targets D Market Industry Changes / Momentum 
H Other E Forward-Looking Information  
5 Risk and Opportunities F Other External Trends Affecting the Company 
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A Risks G Management's Plans / Actions 
B Opportunities H Stock Estimation, Performance / Firm Overall Analysis   
C Swot I Past estimation accuracy  / Relative reliability  
D Other J Investments Strategy / Evaluation Assumptions 
Provided with this research apparatus we were able to code the full text of 
analysts report by defining sentences as recording units. Within any code unit we 
drawn inferences from the text and defined the information units present i.e. 
category and sub-category. In most cases the exact words or vocabulary 
displayed leaded to a direct connection to our categories and sub-categories. 
Others times this connection was not to so obviously, in these cases we trusted 
the researcher's competencies and in his familiarity with the field (Kelle and  
Laurie, 1995), to make those links and to obtain reliable results, admitting 
nevertheless that as in all codification systems, total objectiveness is impossible. 
In order to minimize subjectivity and to ensure coherence and reliability in our 
coding structure we have set a system of codification rules. 
 
 
Table 4 – Codification Rules 
Nº Codification rules 
1 To code means connecting the text to a category and to a subcategory 
2 The recording units are sentences and individual structures. 
3 A sentence is a phrase that ends in (.) or (;) (!), (?). 
4 An individual structure is any Financial Statement, table, graphic or similar object. 
5 A sentence can be coded more than one time, depending of the information provided. 
6 
An individual structure can be coded (Category 1) more than one time, depending on 
the information provided. 
7 A sentence or individual structure cannot have two identical codifications. 
8 
An individual structure is coded as Key financial (1F), only if provides two or more 
financial indicators. 
9 
An individual structure is coded as Comparables (1I), only if provides two or more 
comparables measures / indicators. 
10 
In identical sentences the number of SI ‗s (Same information) units coded is identical 
to the number of units of the primarily information 
11 
When financial information is identified it is coded as 2X (―X‖ meaning the 
subcategory) if it provides quantified information and as 12A if not. 
12 
When Management´s operating data is identified it is coded as 3X (―X‖ meaning the 
sub-category) if it provides quantified information and as 12B if not. 
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13 
When an Analyst or Management Forward Looking Information is identified, it is code 
as 12E or 4E respectively. Subsequently another code is added according to the kind 
of prediction being made (4A) if it is financial, (4B) if it is Operational data and so on. 
14 A trigger is considered Forward Looking Information. 
15 
When Management‘s plans are identified they are coded as 4G if it is possible to 
establish a direct connection to Management‘s words and as 12G if not. 
16 
When an acquisition/sale is identified it is coded as 3C if the references are to the 
capacity added /lost or 2D if the references are to the process of buying/sale. In this 
last case if no price is indicated it is coded as 12A.  
17 
When a comparable measure/opinion is identified, the all sentence is code as 8X (―X‖ 
meaning the subcategory). 
18 
When a paste estimation accuracy evaluation is identified, the all sentence is code as 
12I. 
19 Tittles are not code 
20 
Risks and Opportunities are only coded when the actual word ―Risk‖ ―Opportunity‖ or 
similar ones are used, (examples: danger; jeopardy; threat; hazard; menace etc) or 
(chance; break; possibility etc) 
 
We offer an example taken from our pre-sample codification to help understand 
the coding scheme procedure: 
The Recording Unit (sentence): 
 ―We expect group revenues to increase by 1.6% YoY to €1.6bn, supported by the 
evolution of Vivo and the wireline segment‖,  
 
incorporates 3 information units: 
 
Information unit #1: 12E (―expect‖ is seen as Forward-looking information provided 
by the analyst) 
Information unit #2: 2A (―revenues to increase by 1.6% YoY to €1.6bn‖ is seen as 
a quantified information about revenues) 
Information unit #3: 9A (―Vivo‖ and ―Wireline‖ are seen as segmented information);  
Once all the reports were coded, our last step was to gather all information in an 
excel sheet for statistically and analytic treatment of the results (Appendixes B and 
C). 
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In brief we were able to portray a typical Portuguese sell side analyst report using 
an inductive approach that departed from a text category selection and moved to 
conclusions sustained by quantity measurements. These results were confronted 
with an ideal report framework based on the Jenkins Report insights. 
As previous stated we clearly acknowledge that there is no proportional relation 
between the frequency with which the categories appear in text and the 
importance of the information disclosed (Weber 1990), as with all content analysis, 
it is not realistic to compare quality with quantity, when we have in mind the 
information provided. However we also recognize that by performing a content 
analysis that codes units of data into categories, the higher relative counts should 
return a wider preoccupation with that category (Weber 1990). This contradictory 
fact though difficulty to deal with has its importance diminished by the fact that our 
study aims to offer a systematic description approach rather than a causality one. 
A last but not less important issue is related to the treatment given to non text 
content in the reports. Reports have a copious amount of tables, formulas and 
graphics and because our methodology is focused on text content, it could have 
been difficult to include them in our study. To outcome this problem we have 
chosen to create also a category (Category 1) to code all these table structures, 
this information was treated separately from the text content one.  
Of obvious importance in any academic work is reliability in the research results 
we believe it to be mandatory and a prior condition to the success of any research.  
In reference to our methodology Milne and Adler (1999) notes that ―to permit 
replicable and valid inferences to be drawn from data derived from content 
analysis, content analysts need to demonstrate the reliability of their instruments 
and/or the reliability of the data collected using those instruments.‖ 
Consistency in content analysis methodology involves therefore two separate 
issues: reliability in the data produced by the analysis and in the coding 
instruments used. We aspire to achieve the former by recognizing the 
researcher/coder as a competent language user (Gunter, 2000) with expertise in 
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the research object, the later by ensuring well-defined categories and through the 
application of the formal coding procedure described above.   
We have used also Weber‘s steps mobilization as a framework to ensure and test 
our methodology coherence and validity: 
Table 5 - Weber’s steps  
 Weber’s steps Procedure taken 
1 
Define the recording units (for example 
word, word sense, sentence, or theme) 
The text is coded by sentences. 
Each sentence allows several information units 
according to the information provided. 
The tables and graphics are coded by individual 
structure. 
Each table/graphic structure allows several code 
units according to the information provided. 
2 
Define the categories (for example 
through literature review) 
The categories are defined through a close reading 
of the conclusions of The Committee on Financial 
Reporting, aka Jenkins Report, (AICPA 1994) and 
the FASB - Improving Business Reporting: Insights 
into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures (2001).The 
category codification work by Christina Nielsen 
(2008) was also a point of departure. The pre-
sample coding served also to improve the 
categories system. 
3 
Test coding on sample of text (apply 
abbreviated tags to represent the 
categories) 
Codification tags (Table 3) were created in a pre-
sample test coding work made in 10 reports. 
4 
Assess accuracy or reliability (for 
example whether the coding is correct) 
All the reports were coded in a three step 
procedure. With the first reading we coded the 
category and in a second reading the sub-category. 
This procedure assesses reliability since the first 
coding was not known .Finally we revised the 
former codification in search of errors and of hidden 
information units. 
5 
Revise coding rules (for example 
develop disambiguation rules) 
Coding rules were developed during the pre-sample 
coding. If the text content or the codification rules 
didn’t allow an accurate coding tag the choice was 
to tag it as No Information.  
6 Return to step 3 (until accuracy or Coding thrice all the reports provokes a conceptual 
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reliability is satisfactory) saturation in the text analysis that allows a 
satisfactory reliability in all the process. 
7 Code all the text 
All the reports were coded after a close reading and 
according to the categories system and the 
codification rules.  
8 Assess achieved reliability or accuracy 
The achieved reliability is perceived to be  
Satisfactory 
 
 
 
3.2. Valuation Practices Used  
 
Regarding our second purpose - the identification of the methods that analysts 
employ to evaluate the firms - our research also used a content analysis approach, 
this time in a more straightforward way. 
Typically these reports incorporate earnings forecasts that are linked to a 
calculative apparatus that result in two key summary measures of advice: stock 
recommendations - buy, sell or hold - and Price Targets. Since almost all reports 
usually present a large variety of valuation information, it is important to make 
clear that the model we tried to identify was the one that legitimized the value of 
the Price Target. 
Our procedure was simple, first we searched if the evaluation method was clearly 
expressed in at least one of the reports of the set (we acknowledge a one year 
time period for the disclose of this information); we point out that the use of a 
particular valuation model was only considered if the analyst expressed it in any 
table or narrative. Again and in the spirit of our work we assume that only the 
expressed information is useful to reports users. 
Our research used the formulas described in Demirakos (2004) work as a starting 
point in determining the different models of valuation used. In a following moment 
we tried to determine if the information provided allowed the calculative procedure 
to be reproduced according to the formulas described in Table 6.  
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Table 6 - Valuation Models 
Major 
Valuation 
Models 
Models Definition Formulas 
Single-
Period 
Comparative 
Earnings  
Multiples 
(E) 
Price to Earnings (PE); Enterprise Value 
to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization 
(EV/EBITDA); Enterprise Value to 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EV/EBIT); PEG ratio (PE multiple scaled 
by earnings' growth rate), and Discounted 
Future Earnings Multiple (DFE multiple). 
PE = Price per Share  / Annual Earnings 
per Share 
EV / EBITDA 
Enterprise value = common equity at market value+ 
debt at market value+ minority interest at market value, 
if any– associate company at market value, if any+ 
preferred equity at market value– cash and cash-
equivalents. 
EBITDA = Revenue – Expenses (excluding tax, 
interest, depreciation and amortization) 
EV / EBIT 
EBITDA = Revenue – Expenses (excluding tax, 
interest) 
PEG = PE / Annual EPS Growth 
Vt =[(EBITDAt+1)/(1+WACC)
r
] x (EV/EBITDA) 
When analysts value a firm based on a PE multiple, they 
control for the effects on earnings of nonrecurring events, 
transitory components, and accounting conservatism. 
Where a firm has negative, very low, or very high earnings 
that are unlikely to continue, financial analysts try to 
normalize earnings. 
Sales Multiples 
(S) 
Price to Sales (P/S) and Enterprise Value 
to Sales (EV/S) multiples. 
P/S = Share Price / Revenues per Share 
EV/S = Enterprise Value / Revenues per 
Share 
Price-to-Book 
(BV) 
Stock Price to Book Value per Share. BV = Share Price / Book Value per Share  
Price-to-Assets 
(Assets) 
Stock Price to Asset Value multiple. Assets = Share Price / Assets 
Price to Cash-
Flow (CF) 
Price to Cash Flow multiple. CF = Share Price / Cash-Flow per Share 
Dividend Yield 
(DY) 
The Dividend Yield method. DY = Annual Dividend per Share / Share 
Price 
Enterprise Value 
to R&D (R&D) 
Enterprise Value divided by R&D 
expenditure. 
R&D = EV / R&D expenditure 
Rating to 
Economic Profit  
(REP) 
Ratio of the Market-to-Book Value of the 
enterprise to the return on invested 
capital scaled by the weighted average 
cost of capital. 
REP  = (EVt/ICt)/{ROICt+1/ WACC)   
where EVt  is the market value of the  firm's equity plus 
the book value of the  firm's debt at date t, ICt, is the 
book value of the capital invested in the firm at t,  
ROICt+1, is the expected return on invested capital  in 
period  t + 1, and WACC is the  firm's  weighted  
average  cost  of capital. 
Hybrid 
Accounting 
Rates of Return 
The return on equity (ROE) and return on 
invested capital (ROIC) ratios when 
ROE = Net Income After Tax  / 
Shareholder Equity 
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(ARR) analysts use these as valuation models 
and not simply as indicators of economic 
profitability. 
ROIC = Net Income After Tax  / Invested 
Capital 
Cash Recovery 
Rates (CRR) 
The standard cash recovery rate (CRR) 
and the cash flow return on investment 
(CFROI™). 
CRR =  Cash From Operations / Gross 
Assets  
CFROI = Cash Flow / Market Value Of 
Capital Employed 
Economic Value 
Added (EVA™) 
The return spread times the book value of 
a firm's assets. 
EVA = NOPAT - C x K 
C is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
K is capital employed 
NOPAT Net Operating Profit After Taxes 
Enterprise Value 
Enterprise value is calculated as market 
cap plus debt, minority interest and 
preferred shares, minus total cash and 
cash equivalents. 
Enterprise value =  common equity at 
market value+ debt at market value+ 
minority interest at market value– 
associate company at market value+ 
preferred equity at market value– cash 
and cash-equivalents. 
Multi-period 
Discounted 
Cash-Flow 
(DCF) 
The present value of a firm's cash flows 
over multiple future periods. 
DCF = CF1/(1+r)
1
+CF2/(1+r)
2
+…+ CFn/(1+r)
n 
CF Cash-Flow 
R discount rate (WACC) 
Residual 
Income 
Valuation (RIV) 
Current book value of equity plus the 
present value of residual earnings over 
multiple future periods. 
RIV = Book Value Of Equity + RI/(1+r)
t 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Sample 
4.1. Sample Selection 
 
The use of samples has a unique virtue since it allows the investigator to save on 
research efforts by limiting observations to a manageable subset of units that 
statistically or conceptually reflects the population or universe of interest 
(Krippendorff K.). 
 
Following this idea and as previously stated we used a sample of analysts‘ reports 
in our research that were obtained directly from the publishers. Our original 
sample consisted of 444 reports issued by the four most preeminent Investment 
Font: What Valuation Models Do Analysts Use? 
Ethimios G Demirakos, Norman C. Strong, and 
Martin Walker 
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Firms (hereafter IFs) operating in Portugal. According to Banco de Portugal latest 
published study regarding financial analysts‘ work, these four IFs were responsible 
for 78% of all the reports issued in Portugal in the period of a year.  
 
Since all text codification method relies on the researcher's technical familiarity 
with the subject being analyzed, we have excluded Bank firms. This choice was 
made admitting the inherent difficult to distinguish the operational and financial 
areas of business in these companies. 
 
Also and because in the period of a year the company being followed can have 
their rate suspended or even permanently stopped, we considered only companies 
that had at least one report issued in the first and in the final three months of our 
period. 
 
Since our study applies manual content analysis a labor-intensive data collection 
process, we had inevitably to restrict the sample size employed in our research. 
We can synthesize the sample building process in the following steps:   
 
(i) Initial set of 444 reports from companies listed in the PSI20 Portuguese 
Stock Market and issued by the four most important Portuguese 
Investment Firms. If we consider the time frame of our study these were 
all the reports published. 
(ii) Removal of Bank firms, sample narrowed to 380 reports. 
(iii) Sample narrowed to companies that had at least on report issued in 
both the three initial and final months of our time frame. 335 reports rest. 
(iv) The reports of four companies were randomly chosen from three 
Investment firm and three from another. Final sample includes 73 
reports that represent also 15 units of research7. 
                                                          
7
 For the purpose of building our sample we also acknowledge that the dissemination of analysts' reports occurs in 
three different time circumstances: urgent, timely, and routine (Michaely and Womack, 2003).  
Urgent communications are result normally from an unexpected earnings announcement or other abrupt corporate 
statement and are made while the market is trading. Timely communications is usually disseminated through a morning 
research conference call, before the market opens.  
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Our research used a pre-sample. In harmony with the understanding of 
Krippendorff (1980) a pre-sample is fitted to improve the set of categories of text 
that will be used in the main sample research. Our pre-sample came from the 
same population as the main sample. We used two to three reports from each of 
the four IFs being studied. Our main goal was to develop and improve our 
thematic structure of codification by gaining a wider set of categories that may be 
used in analysts' reports 
4.2. Sample Description 
 
The reports selected for our study were issued by the four most important 
Portuguese Investments Firms and they cover a period between January 2009 to 
December 2010, exception made to the reports from one IF that are from June 
2009 to June 2010.  
There is a total of 701 pages in all the 73 reports, all have at least 4 pages with an 
average number of 9,6. We tested our sample for a relation between the amount 
of information provided and the companies' market capitalizations but no statistical 
evidence of correlation between these variables was found. 
 
These reports were prepared by 14 different analysts, sometimes working as a 
team of two or more members. Normally the same analyst follows more than one 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Routine information is usually collected in written reports and is first disseminated to Investment Firms clients. These 
reports can take several days to be made given the length of time necessary to prepare an extensive report, hence they 
are less urgent and have a wide range of information themes to offer (Michaely and Womack, 2003). 
Because analysts' dissemination of information to their clients happens in these different time circumstances and 
clearly with diverse objectives, one question seems natural: should every report bear the information that our research 
found as ideal, and is it reasonable to expect analysts to repeat or update the information in all the reports issued? 
In our opinion since it is unanimously established that the period of a year is the timeframe recognized for companies to 
measure their performance and calculate their results, the information provided should embrace this alignment. 
The proposal is that analysts should be able to provide all information concerning the firm that they are following in the 
period of a year. Following this idea we also combined our sample in 15 separate units of research; each unit represents 
all the reports issued by one Investment Firms, for a certain company in the period of one year. By doing so we created 
15 complementary pieces of research, hereafter identified as one year sets.  
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company in similar sectors. We identified 12 different sectors and 13 different 
PSI20 listed companies covered by these reports.  
 
Table 7 synthesizes this information and displays the recommendations ratings 
distribution and the implicit price potential change also known as delta8. 
 
Table 7 - Recommendations Description 
 
 Recommendation 
 
Buy / 
 Accumulate 
Hold / 
Neutral 
Sell / 
Reduce 
Investment 
Firm 
Period 
Nº. of 
Reports 
Nº. of 
Companies 
Nº % Nº % Nº % 
Change 
Potential
7 
A 
Jan-09 to 
Dez-09 12 4 11 92% 1 8%   23% 
B 
Jan-09 to 
Dez-09 25 4 25 100%     52% 
C 
Jan-09 to 
Dez-09 17 4 8 47% 6 35% 3 18% 7% 
D 
June-09 
to June-
10 
19 3 16 84% 2 10% 1 5% 38% 
Overall 
 
73 15 60 82,2% 9 12,3% 4 5,5% 33% 
 
Although not the central focus of this research the examination of our sample 
offers significant information to portray Portuguese Investment Firms 
recommendations. 
 
Our sample provides evidences of the long reported (Womack 1996; Phillips and 
Zuckerman 2001; Elton et al 1986) biased behavior in the kind of the 
recommendation made: a large number of Buy recommendations against a rare 
amount of Sell. As stated before and according to previous research the proportion 
up to the early 90s was 10 Buys to 1 Sells. Womack in is 1996 work pointed to 7 
times more Buys than Sells. This tendency is also manifest in Cavezzali (2007) 
paper, in a dataset composed of 3111 reports, 84% forecasts were for an upward 
price change, while 16% were for a downward one. Our results (82,2% buys) are 
                                                          
8
 Delta = (Target price – Current price) / Current price 
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close to the few data available for the Portuguese stock market; with reference to 
the period between 1999 and 2002 and considering only the recommendations 
produced by Portuguese IFs there are evidences of 84% of Buy suggestions in 
1999 with a later decrease in 2002 to values around 60% (Coelho 2002).   
 
A small contribution to the study of the Price Target accuracy in the Portuguese 
Stock Market context can also be added by the study of our sample. In out of 73 
reports we identified 31 (around 42%) in which the Price Target was achieved in 
the time horizon of the recommendation, Bradshaw and Brown (2005) using a 
sample of 95.852 Price Targets for US firms, with a 12-month horizon period 
pointed to 45%, according to Asquith et al (2003) the Price Targets are achieved 
(again in the US market and in a one year period) in 54% of the times. Asquith 
also reported an interesting result, when the Price Target was not achieved the 
average maximum (minimum) price was 84% of the Price Target.   
 
Since we accept as quite probable that the Price Target is achieved when the 
prediction value is close to the current price (a small delta), it is important to 
mention that in almost half (14) of the reports when the prediction was successful 
the delta was minor then 10%. The remaining results are us follow: 
 
Table 8 - Price Target Accuracy 
Price Target Accuracy Nº Reports % 
Achieve 
Delta ≤ 10% 14 19% 
10% < Delta < 50% 14 19% 
Delta ≥ 50% 3 4% 
Not 
Achieve 
Delta ≤ 10% 0 0% 
10% < Delta < 50% 26 36% 
Delta ≥ 50% 16 22% 
 
Our research also shows that there is an average discrepancy of 31% (Coelho 
also for the Portuguese Stock Market points to an average of 22%) between the 
Price Target and the actually price of the stock in the day the recommendation 
was issue. In the last day of the time horizon the average discrepancy decreases 
to 23%, this last result diverges largely from Coelho who found evidence of a 57% 
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and 114% (in a six month and twelve month period respectively) lag between the 
estimation price and the actually stock price. These values change to 45% and 
87% respectively when weighted by the PSI20 performance. These results may 
confirm recently research who suggested ―that forecasting accuracy is very limited: 
prediction errors are consistent, auto-correlated, non-mean reverting and large (up 
to 46%)‖ (Bonini et al, 2009). This idea is also validate by Brav and Lehavy (2003) 
their research found that ―that, on average, the one-year-ahead target price is 28 
percent higher than the current market price.‖  
  
The fact that, at the last day of the time horizon, only 21% of the prices of the 
stocks were higher than the estimation made is also worth of mentioning, 
nevertheless we cannot corroborate for the Portuguese Stock Market, Coelho 
(2003) evidences that no abnormal returns can be achieved in a buy and hold 
recommendation strategy or Barreto (2005) conclusions that positive results can 
be achieved in the long term with a stock picking strategies based on 
recommendations. Our contribution is limited and as previous declared the main 
objective of this work is to determine analysts‘ value using a different approach. 
 
 
 
5. Empirical Research 
5.1. Information Aptitude 
 
As stated our sample has 73 reports containing 1028 table structures and 2444 
sentences, they provided 6601 units of information and 146 where no information 
was found or we were unable to code according to our codification system. We 
have found 613 units that had repeated information (meaning identical sentences).  
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Table 9 – Reports Structure 
Reports Structure Nº 
Total 
Information 
Units 
Average 
Structure 
by Report 
Average 
Codification 
Units by 
Structure 
Average 
Codification 
Units by 
Report 
Average 
Codification 
Units by 
Set 
73 
Sentences 2444 4425 33 1,81 61 295 
Tables 1028 2176 14 2,12 30 145 
 
Also as stated these reports were combined in 15 sets of research (we gathered 
all the reports issued by each of the Investment Firms for the same company in a 
one year period). The four Investment Firms issued an average number of 
approximately 5 reports for each company in this period. This number varied 
largely (amplitude 2-8) and as mentioned before we found no relation between the 
market capitalization and the number of reports issued.  
 
 
 Table 10 – Sets Structure 
Sets 
Average 
Reports 
by Set 
Amplitude: 
Reports by Set Average 
Sentences 
by Set 
Average 
Tables by 
Set Min. Max. 
15 4,96 2 8 163 69 
 
According to our sample research results Portuguese reports tend to share a 
similar structure: the information concerning the company is revealed both in 
tables and text, there is always a section for legal and general disclosers and all 
the times the sector of the company is expressed. It is also always displayed the 
recommendation made, the Price Target (Bradshaw M. T. 2001, points that only 2 
in 3 reports offers this information), the Price Target‘s time horizon, profit forecasts 
and the identity of the analyst(s). All but one of the Investment Firms disclosed its 
risk valuation.  
 
Typically the text is the core structure of these reports and covers a large amount 
of topics, such as business operations events, industry sceneries, management 
plans and outlook, a preview of the results or earnings highlights, the discussion of 
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an extraordinary event which may affect the company, or even analyst overall 
evaluation of the company business and risk exposure.  
 
This layout affinity possibly results of the small number of analysts working in 
Portugal and from the shared profile they respond to. According to numbers from 
2001 more than 90% of the analysts had a degree in Economics or Management 
and 75% of these degrees in one of three Portuguese Universities (CMVM - 1º 
Inquérito sobre a Actividade dos Analistas, 2002). 
 
Regarding the text content research we were able to make 4425 codifications that 
provided an average number of approximately 163 units of information per set.  
These reports also share resemblances regarding the distribution of categories of 
information (according to the standard deviation values) and we believe this 
finding to be important one since it tolerates generalization in the results 
description. The text information units‘ distribution was as follows:  
 
Table 11 - Text Information Units – Distribution by Category 
Text Information Units – Distribution By Category 
Categories / Sets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 M SD A 
Analysts Analysis 59% 50% 50% 67% 39% 33% 30% 48% 54% 47% 54% 42% 60% 58% 47% 49% 10% 30 67 
Financial Data 7% 12% 18% 13% 8% 13% 11% 11% 2% 9% 9% 18% 22% 15% 20% 13% 5% 2 22 
Segment Information 8% 15% 16% 4% 1% 7% 14% 18% 19% 18% 13% 9% 4% 8% 21% 12% 6% 1 21 
Management´s Op. Data 19% 18% 7% 12% 9% 3% 18% 3% 5% 11% 9% 5% 11% 17% 3% 10% 6% 3 19 
Background Information 0% 0% 1% 0% 31% 25% 18% 9% 13% 3% 5% 6% 0% 1% 0% 7% 10% 0 25 
Management´s Analysis 1% 2% 2% 3% 5% 10% 4% 4% 1% 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 4% 3% 2% 1 10 
Comparable Measures 4% 2% 4% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 4% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0 4 
Risk and Opportunities 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 3% 0% 3% 1% 7% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0 7 
Long Term Value Creators 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 1 
Corporate Governance 0% 0% 2% 3% 6% 8% 3% 3% 4% 2% 3% 8% 0% 0% 4% 0% 3% 0 8 
Intellectual Capital / I. A.  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 1 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - - - - 
 
M – Medium; SD – Standard; Deviation A – Amplitude 
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As we can see reports‘ narratives are largely built with opinions and analysis 
drawn by their own authors, in average almost half (49%) of the information 
provided fits in this category. The fact that this sample contains the most important 
Portuguese companies, normally large multi-sector internationalized organizations 
with facilities or business divisions abroad helps explain why 12% of the 
information in these reports has a segment nature,  Nielsen (2008) found a 11,1% 
value relating to this kind of information. 
It comes also with no surprise that quantified Financial and Management’s 
Operational Data is responsible for 13% and 10% respectively of the information 
offered; even though the increasing importance given to the intangible and 
intellectual assets, it seems that analysts and companies will always rely on 
numbers. 
 
Surprisingly this last category, Intangible Capital/Intellectual Capital, is completely 
forgotten by the analysts (in all the 4425 text information units only 8 were coded 
according to this category); the same absence of information is found for the Long 
Term Value Creators category with only 9 units coded. 
The Risks and Opportunities category contributes with only 1% of the information, 
we also detected that one of the Investment Firms always presented a SWOT 
analysis in at least one report of the company.The four categories with more 
information units, offered the following subcategory distribution (Table 12, 13 and 
14): 
    Table 12 - Text Information Units Distribution by Category – Analyst Analysis 
Text Information Units Distribution by Category – Analyst Analysis 
Analyst Analysis 
% In the 
Category 
% In All 
Text 
Forward-Looking Information  28% 14% 
Financial Information 15% 7% 
Management Operating Information 13% 6% 
Stock Estimation, Performance / Company Overall 
Analysis /  
12% 6% 
Market Industry Changes / Momentum 7% 4% 
Investments Strategy / Evaluation Assumptions 6% 3% 
Other External Trends Affecting the Company 6% 3% 
Management's Plans / Actions 6% 3% 
Macroeconomic Trends 4% 2% 
Past estimation Accuracy  / Relative reliability  4% 
 
 
 
% 
2% 
 100% 49% 
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As we can observe and according to our results the analysts‘ analysis are largely 
built surrounding considerations about Forward-Looking Information; their 
prospects and judgments regarding the future of the company plays an important 
role in all the text (14%) and are largely (28%) expressed in their opinions. Not 
surprisingly non quantified Financial and Management Operating Information is 
also a regular topic employed since it allows an overview of the company‘s 
business operations. 
An interesting finding is the articulation of technical issues regarding investment 
strategies (normally advising the use of complex instruments of investment, e.g. 
futures and options)  and the discloser of evaluations assumptions (built to justify 
Price Targets) which accounts for 6% of the information units in the category and 
3% in all text. 
    
                     Table 13 - Text Information Units Distribution by Category – Financial Data 
Text Information Units Distribution by Category – Financial Data 
Financial Data 
% In the 
Category 
% In All 
Text 
EBITDA / Operational Cash Flow 32% 4% 
Turnover / Revenues 18% 2% 
Debt & Financial Costs 12% 2% 
Margins 9% 1% 
Profit & Profitability Measures   8% 1% 
Capital Expenditure / Investment      4% 1% 
Currency  5% 1% 
Other 3% 0 
Working Capital / Opex 2% 0 
Properties  (Sale) 2% 0 
Dividends   1% 0 
D&M 1% 0 
Gearing 1% 0 
Interest Cover  1% 0 
Provision 1% 0 
Tax   0 0 
 100% 13% 
 
According to our sample results, analysts frequently use EBITDA and Revenues 
figures when providing quantified Financial Data; this seems understandable since 
these metrics offer important insights into the financial/economic circumstances of 
the companies, moreover they are excellent tools to compare present results to 
prior ones and also to judge the performance of the firms against their peers. In 
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addition both single and multi-period valuation methodologies rely heavily in 
earnings and sales measures (e.g., Price-to-earnings ratio, EBITDA multiple, Price 
to sales (P/S) and enterprise value to sales (EV/S) multiples). 
The use of more straight and simplistic Profit & Profitability Measures (e.g. net 
income) is less noticeable (8% in the Category and 1% in al Text), the choice 
relies therefore in figures that portray a stable and comparable view of the 
business operations performance instead of figures more permeable to 
extraordinary events that have the ability to influence the results of the companies.  
 
Debt & Financial Cost is an important topic in these reports (represented 2% of all 
the information units coded in the text and 12% in the category).  
Internationalized organizations like the ones in our sample normally make their 
business in more than one currency and consequently their results are sensitive to 
exchange rate movements. Analysts seem to be aware of this matter and 
frequently offer insights into currency movements and their consequences to the 
companies (5% in the Category).   
 
The Segmented Information Category that represents 12% of all the text has only 
one generic subcategory which hosts several forms of segmentation (Industry, 
Markets, Geography and Products).  Again to make easy the identification of 
information units concerning this category and since they are intrinsically 
connected to the company‘s uniqueness, we have created a list that allowed a 
more coherent detection (see Appendix B). 
 
Table 14 
Text Information Units Distribution by Category – Management’s Op. Data 
Management´s Operational Data 
% In the 
Category 
% In All  
Text 
Products / Productivity  / Capacity /Volumes / Stores 39% 4% 
Growth drivers / Value drivers  31% 3% 
Sales / Market Share / Orders /Demand/ Prices 26% 3% 
Costs 3% 0 
Other 2% 0 
 100% 10% 
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The information units related with Management’s Operational Data concern three 
major subcategories which added represent 95% of the total, they relate to 
Products and Production measures, Sales related data and Value and Growth 
drivers. Remarkable is the quantity of information linked to this last subcategory 
(31% in the Subcategory and 3% in all the text) these indicators are essentially 
connected with the exceptional characteristics of the company‘s business and 
therefore to allow there correct identification again we detailed a set of subjects 
that can be associated with them (see Appendix D). 
Significant is the absence of units of information regarding measurements of 
Costs.  
 
Concerning the tables, we were able to detect at least one of these structures in all 
reports. In average a report has 14 tables with amplitude that goes from 2 to 27. 
When we consider the 15 units of research, our results shows that the Investment 
Firms provide an average of 145 tables spread by the different reports issued in 
the year. The distribution of the subcategories is as follows: 
   
Table 15 - Table Structures Units – Distribution 
Table Structures Units – Distribution 
Categories / Sets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 M SD A 
Balance Sheet 3% 2% 0 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 7% 4% 4% 4% 7% 4% 6% 4% 2% 0 7% 
Income Statement 6% 6% 7% 6% 8% 4% 4% 4% 7% 4% 4% 4% 7% 4% 8% 6% 1% 4% 8% 
Cash-Flow 3% 2% 0 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 7% 4% 4% 4% 8% 9% 2% 4% 2% 2% 9% 
Segmented 5% 13% 13% 6% 0 3% 3% 6% 0 9% 4% 4% 6% 17% 18% 7% 6% 0% 17% 
Share P./ H.& Stock Data 5% 6% 9% 4% 13% 13% 14% 11% 15% 18% 13% 21% 5% 4% 4% 10% 6% 4% 21% 
Key Financials 17% 19% 21% 21% 13% 15% 16% 15% 2% 5% 4% 3% 16% 14% 11% 13% 7% 2% 21% 
Estimates 41% 37% 34% 44% 42% 4% 39% 37% 30% 23% 23% 21% 4% 35% 35% 35% 7% 21% 41% 
Valuation 15% 10% 7% 12% 17% 17% 16% 14% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 11% 10% 4% 5% 17% 
Comparables 2% 2% 2% 0 0 1% 0 1% 8% 10% 14% 18% 5% 4% 4% 5% 6% 0 18% 
Other 5% 4% 7% 0 0 0 0 5% 17% 15% 23% 14% 2% 4% 0 6% 7% 0 23% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - - - 
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Regarding the three most important Financial Statements (Balance Sheet, Income 
Statement and Cash Flow) only 11 (about 15%) reports failed to deliver all of 
them, and if we consider our 15 research units only one set fail to provide it. 
 
In the 73 reports, there are 93 balances sheets, 121 income statements and 101 
cash flows statements, frequently these maps are designed for different business 
units or industry locations of the company, providing therefore segmented 
information and explaining why there are more of these statements than reports. 
 
Also we were able to code 203 tables (near one in five) that offer segmented 
information (7% of the Category), 190 tables with share and shareholders data 
(10% of the Category), 279 tables with key financials and 224 tables with valuation 
information (13% and 10% respectively of the category). Only around 5% of these 
structures provide comparable measures.  
An important finding is that almost all (796, around 75%) tables offer some kind of 
outlook, or estimations data, this account for 35% of all the units of information 
withdrawn from these structures.  
 
What is therefore the informative of ability these reports offer? Are they able to 
meet their users‘ needs?  
First of all when focusing in the informativeness of these reports is important to 
mention that regardless of the technique (e.g. disclosure index, content analysis, 
disclosure frequency) applied to evaluate their disclosure ability the interpretation 
of the results could in rigor only be made relatively, in other worlds by ranking and 
comparing companies with each other. Since there is no starting point to evaluate 
their informativeness - the Jenkins Reports offers broad principles of disclosure 
rather than fix and quantified measures; our option was to describe Portuguese 
average reports and confront their disposition with the main ideas and conclusions 
behind the Jenkins Report. Even though our reading of the results lack the 
hardiness of a definite one, we believe the benefits of our decision clearly 
outweigh the costs and are for that reason a solid starting point in reaching an 
understanding of these subjects. 
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Bearing in mind this idea our research conclusions can be summarized in the 
following table: 
 
Table 16- Research Conclusions 
Financial Reports Should 
(according to the Jenkins 
Report) 
Research Conclusion  
 Provide Financial 
Statements elements 
 Regarding the three most important Financial 
Statements (the Balance Sheet, the Income 
Statement and the Cash Flow Statement) 
only 11 (about 15%) reports fail to deliver all 
of them, and if we consider our 15 research 
units we can see them always being provide. 
Need Accomplished. 
√ 
 Provide more information 
with a forward-looking 
perspective, including 
management's plans, 
opportunities, risks, and 
measurement of 
uncertainties.   
 Almost all tables (796, around 75%) offer 
some kind of outlook, or estimation 
information, this account for 35% of all the 
codification made regarding the tables 
structures. Concerning the text content 
almost 15% of all information provides a 
forward looking perspective, though only 5% 
of it represents truly management plans, the 
other 95% comes from analyst’s forecasts.. 
Need Accomplished. 
√ 
 Focus more on the factors 
that create longer term 
value, including non-
financial measures 
indicating how key business 
processes are performing.   
 Total absence of Long Term Value Creators 
(see note 3) information, with only 9 units 
coded. Need Not Accomplished. 
X 
 Provide Business Data (for 
example, high-level 
operating data and 
performance measurements 
that management uses to 
manage the business) 
 All the sets (one year sets) offer at least one 
Profit and Loss statement. Regarding 
financial data (Category 2), 4% is a Cash-
Flow measure and around 1% concerns 
Margins. These reports offer also plenty 
(10%) of specific business data (Category 3), 
concerning Products and Productions 
measures (4%), Sales measures (3%) and 
√ 
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other KPIs (3%). 
Need Accomplished. 
 Management's analysis of 
business data (for example, 
reasons for changes in the 
operating and performance-
related data, and the identity 
and past effect of key 
trends) 
 Provide management's 
perspective. Many users 
want to see a company 
through the eyes of its 
management to help them 
understand management's 
perspective and predict 
where management will lead 
the company.  
 All 15 sets are able to provide information 
regarding Management´s view of the 
business; in average this Category (4) 
provides 3% of all text codification. This 
value was achieved even though the 
category was only coded when it was 
possible to establish a direct connection 
between the text and Management’s words. 
Moreover the analyst itself provides a great 
amount of this kind of information, 
subcategory 12G which is directly linked to 
Managements Plans and actions has an 
average value of 3% of all the text coded. 
Need Accomplished 
√ 
 Report separately on each 
business segment of a 
company's business having 
diverse opportunities and 
risks. Segment information 
provides additional insight 
into the opportunities and 
risks of investments and 
sharpens predictions.  
 Frequently the Financial Statements are 
specially designed for different business 
units or industry locations of the company, 
providing therefore segmented information. 
Around 7% of all table structures codification 
can be seen as adding segmented 
information. Regarding the text content there 
is also a great amount of segmented 
information, Category 9 (Segment 
Information) has an average value of 12%. 
There is no doubt  these reports offer plenty 
of information regarding the diverse 
industries, products and geographical 
localizations of the companies.  Need 
Accomplished. 
√ 
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 Background about the 
company (for example, 
broad objectives and 
strategies, scope and 
description of business, 
products, costumers etc.) 
 Even though two of the Investment Firms and 
therefore 8 of the sets have plenty of 
information about the background of the 
company (Category 7), the other two IFs 
failed to provide any kind of this information. 
We acknowledge that Financial Statements 
can “also help users understand the nature 
of a company's business by indicating the 
types of its assets, the need for working 
capital, the types of its revenues, the general 
nature of its expenses, the sources and uses 
of its cash flows, and other aspects of its 
business. Further analysis of financial 
statements over time can help users 
understand the relationship between cost, 
volume, and profit.” (From the Jenkins 
Report).  Nevertheless the complete absence 
of information regarding the Strategy, 
Mission and Vision of the companies allow 
us to consider that this need should be 
improved.  
√ 
X 
 Information about 
management and 
shareholders (for example, 
directors, management, 
compensation, major 
shareholders, and 
transactions and 
relationships among related 
parties) 
 There is a solid (10% on average per set) 
amount of information in the tables 
structures regarding the Stock 
Performance/Data and also Data from 
Shareholders, moreover this type of  
information is divided in a balanced way 
throught out all the sets. In the text  Category 
10 (Corporate Governance) presents 
contradictory values. Though the majority of 
the sets (11 sets) offer this type of 
information in a substantial quantity (the set 
average value is around 3%) all the 
information is related to transactions and 
relationships among related parties (10E) and 
shareholders/stakes information in general 
(10D) .Consequently there is a total lack of 
details about Board Structure & Assignments 
(10A) and Governance in General (10C). 
√ 
X 
 Indicate the relative 
reliability of information in 
 The relative reliability of the information 
provided can be accessed by studying if it is √ 
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business reporting. Users 
need to be able to 
distinguish between 
information that is highly 
reliable and that which is 
less reliable. 
clear the difference between qualitative and 
quantity data and between  facts and 
estimates. In all the reports this difference is 
clear: almost one quarter of the information 
provided in the text is quantified (Category 2 
accounts for an average value of 13% and 
Category 3 for 10%) disclosing therefore 
facts; it is also  clear when the information 
provided has a forecast attribute (15%  of all 
the text information). 
One important information feature presented 
in all the 11 sets concerns past estimation 
accuracy, in other words the analyst is 
capable of a self-evaluation by confronting 
his forecasts with the actual value reached 
(this sub-category 12I has an average value 
of 2%). Need Accomplished. 
 Focus on measurement to 
help users understand a 
company's performance 
relative to that of 
competitors and other 
companies. While 
descriptions of business 
events are important, 
numbers are important too. 
Management should 
disclose the measurements 
it uses in managing the 
business that quantify the 
effects of key activities and 
events.  
 There is no hesitation in assert the ability of 
these reports in delivering quantified 
information (one quarter of all the text 
content coded is quantified). Nevertheless 
the percentage of comparable measure that 
allows users to understand a company´s 
performance relative to that of competitors is 
not high, (category 8 represents only 2% of 
the information provided in the text content). 
This need is however achieved in the tables 
structures, whit an average value of 5% of 
the information provided being understood 
as offering comparables measures. Moreover 
we also acknowledge that “financial 
statements are comparable among 
companies since they help users understand 
performance relative to that of competitors 
and other companies.” 
Need Accomplished. 
 
√ 
 Information about intangible 
assets that have not been 
recognized in the financial 
statements. 
 Total absence of Intellectual Capital / 
Intangible Assets information, in all text 
codification units (4425) only 8 were coded 
according to this category.  
X 
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Need Not Accomplished. 
According to the average values of our 15 units of research, Portuguese analysts‘ 
reports text content provides a great amount of financial (20%) and high level 
operational business data (17%), usually delivered as reflections by the analyst 
itself, only a few (3%) is presented using Management words.    
There is an acceptance of the importance of measurement in these reports, 
normally the information is quantified (63% of the financial information and 61% of 
the operational is), Revenues and EBITDA data account for almost half of the data 
provided by the former, growth drivers, products and productions measures and 
sales data are responsible for almost 96% of the later. Comparable Measures that 
allows users to understand a company performance relative to competitor appear 
frequently in the table structures (5%) and more lightly in the text content (2%).  
Portuguese reports also respond positively when tested against the ability to 
―report separately on each business segment of a company's business‖, around 
12% of the text and 7% of the tables content can be seen as presenting sections 
(different industries, locations or products) of the company. Our research provides 
a similar conclusion regarding forward looking information with almost 15% of all 
information in the text having this characteristic, though only 5% of it represents 
truly management projections, the other 95% comes from analysts‘ forecasts. This 
finding points to an area of potential improvement – though able to provide a great 
amount of business operating data these reports should present more 
management analysis of it. The same conclusion can be taken regarding 
information about Corporate Governance and also about the Strategy, Mission and 
Vision of the companies, categories where the lack of information is obvious. 
 
On the negative side Portuguese Investment Firms reports fail tremendously to 
provide any relevant details regarding Intangible Assets and facts that can relate to  
Long Term Value Creators. 
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5.2. Valuation Models 
 
In our investigation into the valuation methods used by financial analysts to justify 
the Price Targets again we admitted that this information should be presented in 
the period of the civil year; we used therefore our 15 one year sets as units of 
research. 
As with the information provided by the text, Portuguese reports share great 
similarities regarding the methods used to access the Price Targets. The 
straightest conclusion from our investigation to these methods is that they all rely 
on fundamental analysis, corroborating Arnold et al (1984) previous results. 
 
A remarkable finding is that typically analysts construct precise and sophisticated 
valuation models to evaluate the companies they follow. These specific models 
are built according to the business sector and to the company‘s own 
characteristics.  
This concern with companies‘ intrinsic attributes compels analysts to create 
special features in the calculative apparatus but nonetheless they persistently 
(81% of the times) rely in some explicit multi-period DCF model. This finding 
seems to justify why ―Results‖ and ―Growth Strategies‖ are considered by 
Portuguese analysts as largely important, when asked for the most valued 
information used to establish a firm recommendation9. It also agrees with previous 
literature, namely Penman (2001), Copeland et al. (2000) and Palepu et al. (2000) 
who have a preference for explicit multi-period valuation models based on either 
discounted cash flows or discounted residual value. Impressive is the fact that 
none of the analyst used a Single-Period Multiple valuation to approach Price 
Targets.  
Nevertheless the complexity of the models used, analysts always provide in a 
straightforward way the main evaluation method used to compute the Target Price. 
This is important since analysts frequently make available several valuation ratios 
                                                          
9
 “Results” and “Growth Strategies” ranked first has the most important information regarding a company 
recommendation, in a recent inquiry to Portuguese Financial Analysts (1º Inquérito sobre a Actividade dos Analistas 
Financeiros em Portugal, CMVM, 2003) 
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(usually single period multiples) and cross sector comparables (market multiples) 
in trying to access a firms‘ value10. However, in almost all reports, the Target Price 
is identified with one main model and furthermore explained in a calculative table; 
this table describes the core concepts and calculative structure in which the 
valuation relies. This finding contrasts with Cavezzali (2007) research results who 
in a sample of 4603 reports found that in approximately 70% of the times it was 
not possible to determine the valuation method used; and also contradicts Barker 
(1999) who admitted that analysts have a ―preference for 'unsophisticated' 
valuation‖ the reason being ―the practical difficulty of using currently-available 
information to forecast future cash flows.‖  
Our results are close to Demirakos et al (2004) conclusion who found, ―In contrast 
to prior studies‖ the ―considerable use of explicit multi-period DCF models.‖ This 
could be an interesting finding since it could denote a radical shift in the nature of 
the figures analysts attach importance in evaluating firms; we bring to memory the 
early work by Govindarajav (1980) who in a sample of 976 reports found that in 
87% of the times analyst attributed more relevance to earnings than cash-flows 
which led to the conclusion that ―it is obvious that analysts use earnings 
information on companies significantly more often than they use the cash-flow 
information‖,  however this change is not  totally clear since Asquith et al. (2005) 
sample from 1999 provided evidences of the same nature than Govindarajav. 
 
Another important finding is the constant use of a SOP (Sum Of the Parts) 
approach to evaluate the companies, and this is undoubtedly because analysts 
often estimate Future Cash-Flows by disaggregating the company into geographic 
regions or operating unit (Previts, 1994), our sample results are clearly consistent 
with this conclusion.    
 
Considering what has been described we can summarize the Target Price 
valuation procedure in the following steps: 
 
                                                          
10
 These results are according to previews research for the Portuguese Market, Coelho (2003) documented that all the 
IFs use the DCF method in the price targets calculation and 33% of them also use a Single Period Multiple.  
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1) Selection of a SOP (Sum of the Parts) approach to calculate de Enterprise 
Value.  The companies in the sample frequently have different units of 
business generating distinct Cash-Flows; the option is for a separate 
appraisal of the parts and subsequent sum.  
 
2) Each of these parts is evaluated according to the present value of the Future 
Cash-Flows to meet the Enterprise Value. The Future Cash-Flows 
estimations come from analysts‘ forecasts or from the companies‘ guidance. 
The present value of the FCF comes from discounting them at a finite rate, 
normally the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
 
3)  The Equity Value is obtained by adding, to the sum of the Enterprises 
Value, the Financial Investments of the company and by withdrawing the Net 
Debt and the Minority Interests.  
 
4) Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares. 
 
Table 17 displays a more detailed description of the evaluation models in the 
sampled reports.
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Table 17 - Evaluation Models Employed in Analysts’ Reports that Justify the Price Targets 
Evaluation Models Employed in Analysts’ Reports that Justify the Price Targets 
IF Set 
Nº of 
reports 
Sector 
Valuation 
Model 
Description 
4 
1 3 Renewable 
SOP (EV/MW - 
DCF) 
SOP valuation model specially designed and usually used for the valuation of renewable companies. The operating assets and the pipeline are valued 
according to their Enterprise Value and segmented by business areas. The assets are valuated using an EV/MW multiple with a terminal value; the pipeline 
is valued using DCFs and assuming capacity forecasts. It is disclosed some assumptions for the valuation of the operating assets. Equity Value is achieved 
by withdrawing Net Debt. Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares. Absence of WACC and Terminal Growth Rate (g) assumptions. 
2 2 Food Retail SOP (EV – DCF) 
Option for a specially designed valuation model. SOP evaluation where the Enterprise Value of the different business units is added. Each of these units is 
valued using DCFs that result from capacity, sales and currency forecasts. Equity Value is achieved by withdrawing Net Debt and adding Minorities Average 
Net Debt. The WACC value is mentioned but not the assumptions. Terminal Growth Rate (g) disclosed. 
3 5 Telecom. SOP (EV – DCF) 
SOP valuation model. Parts divided by localization and nature of the business. Each of these units is valued according to the present value of FCFs. Two 
small business parts are valued by Multiples and Market Value. Equity Value is achieved by withdrawing final year estimation debt. Discount Rate and 
Terminal Growth Rate (g) not offered. 
 2 Forestry 
EV – DFCF 
& 
SOP (EV-DCF) 
Equity value provided by Multi-Stage Discounted Cash Flows method. All assumptions are provided (a)Three years Cash-Flow projections; (b)Terminal 
Growth Rate;  (c) Terminal Value; (d) WACC assumptions (cost of debt; % of debt; beta; market premium); (e) Net Debt and other liabilities. Free Cash 
Flows used in the Evaluation Table differ from the ones in the Cash Flow Statement Forecasts table. Another report provides the same method with the 
Equity Value resulting from a SOP where the parts are the different geographic units of the company. In this report only the final value of the WACC and the 
Terminal Growth rate is provided.  
2 
5 5 
Industrial 
Transp. & 
Motorways 
SOP (EV - DCF) 
SOP evaluation where the Enterprise Value of the different concessions is added. Each of these units is valued using DCFs that result from traffic, operating 
margins and cost forecasts and also from the company guidance.Equity value is achieved by withdrawing final year estimation debt and by adding company 
investments stakes at Market Value. Terminal Growth Rate (g) not offered. All WACC assumptions are disclosed for all the different concessions CFs.  
6 6 Utilities 
SOP (EV – DCF 
– MV – EBITDA 
– BV) 
The Enterprise Value results from a SOP approach. Parts are Business Units and Financial Investments. The main units are valued with a DCFs approach 
and the others are valued with a forecast EBITDA multiple and also using Market Value. One of the Business Units is a stake in a company that is also 
followed by the IF, the valuation results in this case from multiplying the stake by the company fair value previous determined (Price Target). 
All WACC assumptions are disclosed for all the different Business Units FCFs. The Financial Investments are valued either according to their Market Prices 
or to their Book Value.   
7 6 Utilities SOP (EV - DCF) 
The Enterprise Value results from a SOP approach. The parts are the main geographic business areas where the company operates and are valued through 
a DCFs method. The Cash-Flows forecasts are mainly associated to capacity and price estimations. Equity value is achieved by withdrawing final year 
estimation debt and by adding company investments stakes. Only the WACC assumptions are disclosed. 
8 8 
Construction 
& Materials 
SOP (EV – DCF) 
Well described SOP evaluation approach; the Enterprise Value is achieved by adding (SOP) the different business areas DCFs. Cash-Flows are estimated 
based on projections for growth in the economies where the company is present and taking into account the favorable current order book; it is also taken in 
account company´s guidance both concerning sales and capex estimates for all areas. The Equity Value is achieved by adding the company Stakes (valued 
at Fair Value) and withdrawing the Adjusted Net Debt. Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares (diluted from own shares). All WACC 
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assumptions are disclosed. All the different areas of business forecasts (Revenues to Free Cash-Flows) are disclosed.   
3 
9 4 
Building 
Materials 
SOP (EV – DCF) 
SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all reports. The Enterprise Value is achieved by adding (SOP) the different markets DCFs, two small market units are 
valued at the acquisition price. The Equity Value is achieved by adding the company Financial Investments and withdrawing the Net Debt and the Minority 
Interests. Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares. The WACC assumptions and the Terminal Growth Rate (g) are only disclosed for one 
business unit.   Disclosure of a Sensitivity Analysis that relates Share Price to different combinations of WACC and Growing Perpetuity rates. 
10 6 Retail SOP (EV – DCF) 
SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all reports. The Enterprise Value is achieved by adding (SOP) DCFs from different business areas/geographic units 
and other Non Core Assets. The Equity Value is achieved by withdrawing the Net Debt adjusted for the Company minorities. Finally the Equity Value is 
divided by the number of shares. The WACC assumptions for the different business areas / geographic units are disclosed and also the Terminal Growth 
Rate (g). Disclosure of a Sensitivity Analysis that relates Share Price to different combinations of WACC and Growing Perpetuity rates. 
11 4 
Pulp & 
Paper 
Historic Multiples 
Replacement 
Cost 
Two valuation models applied but none of them justifies the Price Target. 
1) Fair Value evaluation according  to premium discount percentage to average Historic Multiples (P/BV; EV/Tonne; EV/IC) 
2) Fair Value according to Replacement Costs, with assumptions relating USDmn/Tonnes capacity    
12 3 
Construction / 
Infrastructures 
SOP (EV – DCF 
– EV/EBITDA 
Multiple – MV – 
Acquisition Price 
- GAV – Fair 
Value) 
SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all the reports. The evaluation of each of the different Business Units is achieved by a specific method. The most 
common is by applying a multiple to the end of year EV/EBITDA ratio, in other cases the choice is for a Market Value or an Acquisition Price approach. If the 
part is a stake in a company also followed by the IF the EV is achieved by multiplying the stake by the Price Target previous determined. The Equity Value is 
achieved by withdrawing the Net Debt the Company minorities and the Holding Costs and by adding the Company Other Financial Investments. The Equity 
Value is then divided by the number of shares. Finally it is made a percentage Discount recognizing the SC & Holding nature of the company (a common 
practice).  
4 
13 5 Industrials SOP (EV – DCF) 
Holding detailed SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all the reports. The Enterprise Value for each of the Business Areas results from a DFCF method, 
the Cash Flows estimations are done for several decades. The FCFs forecasts are provided for a large amount of years though not for all years considered 
in the model. The Perpetuity Rate of Growth is disclosed.  All WACC assumptions for each of the Business Areas are provided. The Equity Value of the 
Business Areas is met by withdrawing the Adjusted Net Debt. The Holding Equity Value is achieved by multiplying the stake own by the Equity Value of the 
Business Areas. Finally it is added (according to the Book Value) Other Financial Stakes and removed the value of both the Adjusted Net Debt and the Net 
Dividends to Pay. Disclosure of a Sensitivity Analysis that relates Share Price to different combinations of Risk Free Rates to Debt Spreads. 
14 7 Utilities SOP (EV – DCF) 
SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all the reports. The Enterprise Value is achieved by adding (SOP) the different Business Areas DCFs; two small 
business units are valued at the Price to Book Value. The FCFs forecasts are disclosed for a large amount of years though not for all years considered in 
the model. The Equity Value is achieved by adding the company Other Financial Investments and withdrawing the Adjusted Net Debt and the Minority 
Interests. Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares. The WACC assumptions for the main markets are disclosed. Disclosure of a 
Sensitivity Analysis that relates Share Price to different combinations of Spread Over Governmental Bonds to Debt Spread. 
15 7 Conglomerate SOP (EV – DCF) 
Holding SOP evaluation approach disclosed in all the reports. The Enterprise Value is achieved by adding the DCFs of the different Stakes hold by the 
Company. One of this stakes is from a company also followed by the IF and therefore the EV comes from multiplying the stake by the Price Target already 
determined.  The Equity Value is achieved by adding the company Other Financial Investments and withdrawing the Adjusted Net Debt Holding and the 
Minority Interests. Finally the Equity Value is divided by the number of shares. The WACC assumptions for the main markets are disclosed. Disclosure of a 
Sensitivity Analysis that relates Share Price to different combinations of Spread Over Governmental Bonds to Debt Spread. 
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We have also examine the length of disclosure regarding the information 
required to execute the calculative procedure, inputs like the value of the Future 
Cash-Flows and the time horizon and also the method parameters  (such as, 
discounting rates, market risk premium etc), the main results obtained can be 
summarized as follow: 
Table 18 – Length of Disclosure 
Set 
Valuation 
Model 
WACC 
(rate) 
WACC 
Assumptions
11
 
Forecast 
Period 
Cash-Flows 
Terminal 
Rate Growth 
(g) 
Terminal 
Value 
Replicable 
1 DCF No No No Yes No No No 
2 DCF Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
3 DCF No No No No No No No 
4 DCF Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes 
5 DCF Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
6 DCF Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
7 DCF Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
8 DCF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9 DCF Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
10 DCF No No No No No No No 
11 EM/RC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
12 Various N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
13 DCF Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
14 DCF Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
15 DCF Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
 
The most significant conclusion regarding this matter is that only in two occasions 
the amplitude of disclosure was sufficient to allow a user of the report to repeat 
(replicate) the calculation and achieve the same Price Target. 
Nevertheless this limitation, Portuguese reports offer broad elements of 
information related to the method applied, that we can summarize as follows  
a) The Valuation Method is always disclosed (13 in 15 times it is a DCF 
model). 
b) About half the times the Cash Flows forecasts are not revealed, large 
time horizons combine with reports lay out restrictions seems to be the 
reason. 
c) The Cash-Flows discount rate that analysts use is always the WACC, 
and this value is provided 77% of the times and when that happens in 
90% of the times also the WACC assumptions are offered.  
                                                          
11
 WACC Assumptions: Cost of Debt; Percentage of Debt; Beta; Market Premium Tax rate 
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In short it is possible to affirm that even though lacking the necessary information 
to replicate the calculation made, Portuguese reports have in general the potential 
information to enable there readers with an understanding of the principles beyond 
the Price Targets computation. 
6. Conclusions 
 
Throughout this paper we argued that frameworks help investors decide and act. 
We also argued that these cognitive instruments must rely on information and for 
that reason analysts‘ ability to offer the information reports users require should be 
a valid proxy to their importance in the financial markets. We used Portuguese 
analyst‘s reports from the four most relevant Investment Firms to study this ability 
and by doing so we also aimed to unveil important aspects of analysts‘ activity in 
the Portuguese context. Furthermore, we investigated and documented 
transparency and rigor in Price Target calculations, those qualities in such an 
important issue, we believe, ought to be mandatory. 
 
The major contributions that arose from our pursuit include (1) a new approach in 
accessing the importance of sell-side financial analysts and a new method to 
evaluate it, (2) a pioneer content analysis made to Portuguese sell-side financial 
analysts‘ reports (3) a description of their informativeness, and finally (4) a look to 
the methods analysts use to evaluate companies and to calculate their Price 
Targets. 
 
Our paper documents that Portuguese analysts‘ reports in general disclose 
substantial financial information and the required financial statements. At the same 
time they provide extensive operational data and performance measurements that 
are presented both in segment and comparable manners. Furthermore they offer a 
great amount of forward looking information and are capable to embrace the 
management's perspective about the firm‘s business. Although competent to meet 
users most obvious needs Portuguese Investment Firms reports fail to provide 
important categories of information like Corporate Governance or Intangible 
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Assets data, they also lack the ability to deliver Long Term Value Creators 
matters. 
 
The light that our research shed over the methods used to calculate the Price 
Targets is consistence and adds to all the previous literature that documented a 
primacy of Discounted Cash Flows Methods in accessing Price Target values. It 
also emerges from our research that analysts appear to tailor their valuation 
methodologies to the intrinsic circumstances of the company. 
 
Overall, our research results provides preliminary evidences that Portuguese 
Investment Firms financial reports answer the main questions address by the 
Special Committee on Financial Reporting aka Jenkins Report, and are for that 
reason able to deliver the information reports users need. Moreover they offer 
suitable data and calculative procedures that enable reports users to build ideas 
and theories that can justify their actions. These reasons allow us to conclude that 
sell-side analysts undeniably play an important role in the financial markets. 
 
One potential limitation of our work is related to the size of the sample used but 
nevertheless this constrain we were able to portray a typical Portuguese sell side 
financial analyst report. This standard report enabled us to access their average 
informativeness, but the interpretation of these results can as previous declared be 
made only relatively - the Jenkins Report offers wide principles of reporting not fix 
measures of the information to be disclose. For this reason we believe that our 
preliminary quantified examples of how the information categories are distributed 
in these reports has the undeniable virtue of being a departing point to future 
academic research that can enhance the utility of both financial reporting and 
analysts themselves.  
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Appendix A: Institutional Investors' rank of desirable analyst by U.S. equity assets under 
management 
 
Institutional Investors' rank of desirable analyst by U.S. equity assets under management. Source: www.ii.com 
Overall 
Ranking 
Attributes 
$75 b. or 
More 
$30 b.    
to $74 b. 
$10 b.    
to $29 b. 
$5 b.      
to $9.9 b. 
$1 b       
to $4.9 b. 
Less than 
$1 b. 
1 Industry Knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Written Reports 3 2 3 3 3 2 
3 Special Services 2 3 2 5 5 5 
4 Servicing 4  4 2 6 6 
5 Stock Selection 6 5 5 4 2 3 
6 Earnings Estimates 5 6 6 6 4 4 
7 Quality of Sales Force 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 Market Making/Execution 8 8 8 8 8 8 
 
Appendix B - Coding Results By Report
112 38 86 35 192 46 46 42 46 31 59 71 63 64 62 65 83 51 52 61 69 55 90 52 97 68 61 70 51 80 86 342 53 93 66 52 178 56 51 69 48 79 196 164 159 71 157 66 312 76 67 57 157 54 76 98 88 73 79 232 97 98 94 88 123 79 75 91 76 130 107 97 93
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 % Total % Cat.
1 Financial Statements & Tables 1 33 8 25 11 41 11 14 14 14 3 23 29 24 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 22 25 26 25 25 25 25 22 6 26 25 55 25 25 19 25 46 12 12 24 12 14 30 31 25 17 26 14 45 21 14 13 44 14 37 38 37 44 40 62 53 56 47 56 60 49 47 42 42 69 54 54 53 2176 0,49
a Balance Sheet a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 94 0,02 0,04
b Income Statement b 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 121 0,03 0,06
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g Estimates g 14 2 11 4 15 4 5 5 5 11 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 1 10 10 19 10 9 7 10 17 4 4 6 4 5 7 5 5 5 5 4 11 4 4 4 7 4 15 15 15 18 16 22 20 19 17 19 21 17 17 15 15 24 19 19 19 769 0,17 0,35
h Valuation h 5 2 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 8 3 5 2 4 5 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 10 7 7 8 224 0,05 0,10
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e Debt  / Financial Costs e 4 2 3 1 7 1 1 2 1 3 1 6 1 3 1 5 7 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 4 2 2 72 0,02 0,13
f Dividends  f 1 1 1 1 1 5 0,00 0,01
g D&M g 1 1 2 4 0,00 0,01
h Gearing h 2 1 1 1 1 6 0,00 0,01
i Interest cover i 2 1 1 2 6 0,00 0,01
j Properties  (Sale) j 1 1 1 1 1 5 0,00 0,01
l Profit & profitability measures  l 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 37 0,01 0,07
m Provision m 1 1 1 1 4 0,00 0,01
n Tax  n 0 0,00 0,00
o Currency o 1 1 5 1 2 6 2 1 1 3 3 1 27 0,01 0,05
p Working capital / Opex p 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 0,00 0,02
q Other q 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 1 15 0,00 0,03
3 Management´s Operational Data 3 16 9 7 8 24 2 0 1 3 5 0 9 2 4 3 5 5 0 2 0 3 0 3 4 6 11 7 8 13 0 3 5 0 4 3 2 2 5 2 1 1 5 20 14 18 2 10 8 29 0 5 1 7 1 6 9 5 3 1 26 7 7 9 5 14 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 0 411 0,09 1,00
a Costs a 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 11 0,00 0,03
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c Products / Productivity / Production / Capacity /Volumes / Stores c 14 5 5 5 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 4 6 3 5 7 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 9 2 3 2 2 11 2 2 3 2 1 1 13 3 3 5 2 5 1 2 1 1 1 2 159 0,04 0,39
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a Excellence / Inovation / Company Specific a 1 2 1 4 1 9 0,00 1,00
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a Objectives / Strategy a 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 1 5 1 1 25 0,01 0,08
b Vision / Mission b 3 3 0,00 0,01
c General development of the business c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 8 1 39 0,01 0,12
d Products d 4 4 4 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 4 2 2 82 0,02 0,26
e Industry / Markets e 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 6 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 85 0,02 0,27
f Processes f 1 2 1 4 0,00 0,01
g Customers / Clients g 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 47 0,01 0,15
h Competitors h 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 0,00 0,04
i Properties i 3 2 5 0,00 0,02
j External regulation / Legal Conditions j 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 9 0,00 0,03
l Other l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 0,00 0,03
8 Comparable measures 8 3 1 3 0 4 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 6 4 10 2 4 2 14 3 2 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0,02 1,00
a Financial and opertating  data a 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 4 1 1 23 0,01 0,29
b Other Comparisons across peers and competitors b 1 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 15 0,00 0,19
c Stock Performance  / Company Valuation c 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 3 1 7 3 3 41 0,01 0,51
d Other d 1 1 0,00 0,01
9 Segment information 9 1 5 7 6 20 4 6 6 3 6 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 2 5 1 2 3 3 11 7 5 4 7 12 10 43 5 15 9 5 27 5 8 10 8 9 31 22 29 8 21 3 35 9 6 3 11 3 2 1 1 1 3 6 3 3 6 4 8 1 5 14 9 9 10 13 11 579 0,13 1,00
a Industry / Market /Geography / Products a 1 5 7 6 20 4 6 6 3 6 3 1 2 2 2 5 1 2 3 3 11 7 5 4 7 12 10 43 5 15 9 5 27 5 8 10 8 9 31 22 29 8 21 3 35 9 6 3 11 3 2 1 1 1 3 6 3 3 6 4 8 1 5 14 9 9 10 13 11 579 0,13 1,00
b Other b 0 0,00 0,00
10 Corporate governace / Information about management and shareholders 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 6 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 0 4 1 2 1 5 6 1 4 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 8 1 1 7 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 6 4 1 0 130 0,03 1,00
a Board structure and assignments a 1 1 0,00 0,01
b Division of power between board and management b 0 0,00 0,00
c Governance in general c 1 1 2 0,00 0,02
d Shareholders / Stakes d 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 1 2 7 5 2 4 1 1 2 2 1 68 0,02 0,52
e Transactions and relationsghips among related parties e 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 1 54 0,01 0,42
f Other f 1 2 1 1 5 0,00 0,04
11 Intellectual capital / Intangible Assets 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0,00 1,00
a Employees a 0 0,00 0,00
b Core competences b 1 1 2E-04 0,13
c Core knowledge and technology c 1 1 2 5E-04 0,25
d Organizational, structural & relational capital d 1 1 2 5E-04 0,25
e Patents  / Brand e 1 1 1 3 7E-04 0,38
f Other f 0 0,00 0,00
12 Analysts analysis 12 49 11 40 9 79 19 19 14 15 10 27 25 20 15 15 13 21 10 7 13 4 11 30 7 15 10 9 23 18 30 13 156 17 22 13 13 74 23 20 27 19 29 83 70 54 24 65 24 150 41 21 16 52 15 22 37 35 20 17 111 26 22 29 15 26 22 18 20 12 29 21 20 16 2147 0,49 1,00
a Financial Information a 2 1 11 10 3 3 3 4 2 2 5 5 2 3 2 3 3 2 6 2 1 6 1 4 2 3 1 5 2 22 2 8 4 3 4 1 1 1 2 5 10 8 5 6 7 3 12 3 3 9 1 6 9 9 2 3 13 10 6 5 5 5 3 5 4 3 1 6 3 317 0,07 0,15
b Management Operating Information b 5 2 7 3 3 1 2 2 4 3 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 4 1 14 5 6 2 4 3 1 6 5 3 3 7 10 2 3 10 5 28 7 7 3 1 1 6 7 6 5 2 24 3 6 5 5 2 1 4 7 1 1 5 1 288 0,07 0,13
c Macroeconomic trends c 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 12 4 2 1 0 1 9 4 2 2 2 6 1 1 2 1 1 1 78 0,02 0,04
d Market Industry changes / momentum d 1 1 12 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 6 14 1 11 4 1 3 2 2 4 7 2 2 2 22 18 1 1 1 3 5 2 3 7 3 1 2 4 4 1 1 171 0,04 0,08
e Forward-looking information e 17 6 11 5 24 6 8 6 8 1 12 9 9 7 6 9 4 5 3 4 5 6 3 3 3 3 2 8 22 7 1 4 8 7 5 9 6 9 20 13 17 8 21 7 36 5 7 5 3 3 5 8 7 6 20 7 5 10 2 5 1 4 4 2 13 13 2 1 531 0,12 0,25
f Other external trends affecting the company f 4 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 21 5 2 1 3 1 4 4 3 3 1 2 2 1 4 2 1 22 2 1 2 10 1 1 127 0,03 0,06
g Management's plans/actions, including critical success factors g 7 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 1 2 5 1 10 1 2 10 6 4 1 6 7 1 3 7 1 1 10 1 1 107 0,02 0,05
h Stock Estimation / Company Overall Analysis / Stock Performance h 2 4 11 1 1 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 2 8 3 3 16 3 3 1 2 12 4 4 6 5 7 20 14 13 4 12 5 22 5 3 7 15 6 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 273 0,06 0,13
i Past estimation accuracy  / Relative reliability / Comparation to last estimations / Change in Estimationsi 2 3 1 6 7 5 1 1 4 5 4 5 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 3 5 92 0,02 0,04
j Investments Strategy / Evaluation Assumptions) j 7 2 6 3 1 2 1 20 21 2 1 5 11 2 1 19 1 8 5 1 1 11 1 6 1 4 9 1 6 1 1 2 163 0,04 0,08
SI 20 1 38 15 28 36 1 36 1 20 3 10 31 7 26 19 13 6 21 27 20 27 23 13 31 31 27 22 32 28 613
NI 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 5 4 2 3 2 3 24 5 3 3 2 4 1 2 1 6 3 2 4 2 5 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 2 2 1 2 6 4 2 1 2 3 146
Total Text Units Of Information 112 38 86 35 192 46 46 42 46 31 59 71 63 64 62 65 83 51 52 61 69 55 90 52 97 68 61 70 51 80 86 342 53 93 66 52 178 56 51 69 48 79 196 164 159 71 157 66 312 76 67 57 157 54 76 98 88 73 79 232 97 98 94 88 123 79 75 91 76 130 107 97 93 4425
Total Table StructuresUnits Of Information 112 38 86 35 192 46 46 42 46 31 59 71 63 64 62 65 83 51 52 61 69 55 90 52 97 68 61 70 51 80 86 342 53 93 66 52 178 56 51 69 48 79 196 164 159 71 157 66 312 76 67 57 157 54 76 98 88 73 79 232 97 98 94 88 123 79 75 91 76 130 107 97 93 2176 29,8082
Number of Maps 14 3 11 4 18 4 5 5 5 2 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 14 12 27 12 13 9 12 21 7 7 16 7 8 18 17 14 9 15 8 28 11 8 8 24 8 17 18 17 20 19 29 20 24 20 24 25 21 19 17 17 29 21 21 21 1028 14,0822
Number of Setences 50 10 32 8 67 11 9 8 9 8 21 23 20 20 18 19 53 15 14 16 25 14 46 18 30 18 17 28 51 23 26 166 16 31 25 15 106 15 18 20 16 24 73 70 22 23 60 23 142 31 23 20 63 21 37 40 34 21 26 111 36 34 30 30 41 38 13 34 29 43 32 33 32 2444 33,4795
Number of Reports by Company 4,87
Average Number of Reports 4,95833 300,556
Capitalização Bolsista
Number of Maps By Set 68,53
Number of Sentences By Set 162,93
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EDP REN JM PT S IND
2
1
BRISA EDP EDP REN ME CIMPOR JM PORT TD ALTRI REN SEMAPA
4.098 11.258 5.674 710 3.676 426 1.401 849
9 5 10 0 6 1 2 18 1 5 6 2 1
92 75 45 44 130 130 158 282 254162 408 69 212 279 104
Appendix C - Coding Results By Set
2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00
SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % SOM % M SD VAR Min Max
1 Financial Statements & Tables 1 66 1,00 52 1 56 1 52 1 120 1,00 148 1,00 128 1,00 246 1,00 60 1,00 117 1,00 120 1,00 71 1,00 196 1,00 334 1,00 410 1,00 145
a Balance Sheet a 2 0,030303 1 0,019231 0 0 2 0,038462 5 0,041667 6 0,040541 4 0,03 7 0,028455 4 0,07 5 0,042735 5 0,041667 3 0,042254 13 0,066327 12 0,03593 25 0,060976 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,07
b Income Statement b 4 0,060606 3 0,057692 4 0,071429 3 0,057692 10 0,083333 6 0,040541 5 0,04 11 0,044715 4 0,07 5 0,042735 5 0,041667 3 0,042254 13 0,066327 14 0,04192 31 0,07561 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,08
c Cash-Flow c 2 0,030303 1 0,019231 0 0 2 0,038462 5 0,041667 6 0,040541 5 0,04 8 0,03252 4 0,07 5 0,042735 5 0,041667 3 0,042254 15 0,076531 30 0,08982 10 0,02439 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,09
d Segmented d 3 0,045455 7 0,134615 7 0,125 3 0,057692 0 0 4 0,027027 4 0,03 15 0,060976 0 0,00 11 0,094017 5 0,041667 3 0,042254 11 0,056122 56 0,16766 74 0,180488 0,07 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,17
e Share Performance / Holders & Stock Data e 3 0,045455 3 0,057692 5 0,089286 2 0,038462 15 0,125 19 0,128378 18 0,14 26 0,105691 9 0,15 21 0,179487 15 0,125 15 0,211268 10 0,05102 13 0,03892 16 0,039024 0,10 0,06 0,00 0,04 0,21
f Key Financials f 11 0,166667 10 0,192308 12 0,214286 11 0,211538 15 0,125 22 0,148649 21 0,16 37 0,150407 1 0,02 6 0,051282 5 0,041667 2 0,028169 31 0,158163 48 0,14371 47 0,114634 0,13 0,07 0,00 0,02 0,21
g Estimates g 27 0,409091 19 0,365385 19 0,339286 23 0,442308 50 0,416667 59 0,398649 50 0,39 92 0,373984 18 0,30 27 0,230769 28 0,233333 15 0,211268 79 0,403061 118 0,35329 145 0,353659 0,35 0,07 0,01 0,21 0,41
h Valuation h 10 0,151515 5 0,096154 4 0,071429 6 0,115385 20 0,166667 25 0,168919 21 0,16 35 0,142276 5 0,08 8 0,068376 8 0,066667 4 0,056338 11 0,056122 17 0,0509 45 0,109756 0,10 0,04 0,00 0,05 0,17
i Comparables i 1 0,015152 1 0,019231 1 0,017857 0 0 0 0 1 0,006757 0 0,00 2 0,00813 5 0,08 12 0,102564 17 0,141667 13 0,183099 10 0,05102 13 0,03892 15 0,036585 0,05 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,18
j Other j 3 0,045455 2 0,038462 4 0,071429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 13 0,052846 10 0,17 17 0,145299 27 0,225 10 0,140845 3 0,015306 13 0,03892 2 0,004878 0,06 0,07 0,01 0,00 0,23
2 Financial data 2 12 0,070588 21 0,12 28 0,18 10 0,13 17 0,08 30 0,13 31 0,11 74 0,11 4 0,02 48 0,09 49 0,09 35 0,18 49 0,22 59 0,15 69 0,20 0,13 1,00 0,05 0,00 0,02 0,22 536
a Turnover / Revenues a 0 0,00 4 0,022857 8 0,05 0 0,00 2 0,01 3 0,01 1 0,00 27 0,04 0 0,00 9 0,02 13 0,02 12 0,06 11 0,05 6 0,02 14 0,04 0,02 0,18
b Margins b 1 0,005882 2 0,011429 6 0,04 1 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 13 0,02 0 0,00 3 0,01 7 0,01 1 0,01 4 0,02 1 0,00 8 0,02 0,01 0,09
c EBITDA / Operational Cash Flow c 6 0,035294 5 0,028571 8 0,05 7 0,09 6 0,03 9 0,04 12 0,04 12 0,02 1 0,01 13 0,02 16 0,03 9 0,05 15 0,07 7 0,02 27 0,08 0,04 0,32
d Capital expenditur / Investment     d 1 0,005882 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 3 0,01 7 0,01 1 0,01 0 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 11 0,03 3 0,01 0,01 0,04
e Debt  / Financial Costs e 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 6 0,03 3 0,01 10 0,01 0 0,00 2 0,00 4 0,01 7 0,04 10 0,05 14 0,04 16 0,05 0,02 0,12
f Dividends  f 1 0,005882 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
g D&M g 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
h Gearing h 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 2 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0,00 0,01
i Interest cover i 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 1 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
j Properties  (Sale) j 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0,02
l Profit & profitability measures  l 2 0,011765 3 0,017143 3 0,02 1 0,01 2 0,01 8 0,03 4 0,01 4 0,01 0 0,00 6 0,01 0 0,00 3 0,02 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,08
m Provision m 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
n Tax  n 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
o Currency o 1 0,005882 6 0,034286 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 12 0,02 3 0,01 0 0,00 3 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,05
p Working capital / Opex p 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 5 0,02 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0,02
q Other q 0 0 1 0,005714 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 1 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 7 0,02 0 0,00 0,00 0,03
3 Management´s Operational Data 32 0,188235 32 0,182857 11 0,07 9 0,12 19 0,09 8 0,03 49 0,18 19 0,03 9 0,05 59 0,11 52 0,09 9 0,05 24 0,11 68 0,17 11 0,03 0,10 1,00 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,19 411
a Costs a 1 0,005882 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,01 4 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,03
b Growth drivers / Value Drivers / KPI?? b 3 0,017647 9 0,051429 5 0,03 2 0,03 2 0,01 1 0,00 20 0,07 8 0,01 3 0,02 14 0,03 22 0,04 4 0,02 9 0,04 35 0,09 2 0,01 0,03 0,31
c Products / Productivity / Production / Capacity /Volumes / Stores c 24 0,141176 5 0,028571 1 0,01 2 0,03 5 0,02 5 0,02 28 0,10 5 0,01 4 0,02 15 0,03 17 0,03 0 0,00 9 0,04 31 0,08 8 0,02 0,04 0,39
d Sales / Market Share / Orders /Demand/ Prices d 4 0,023529 18 0,102857 4 0,03 5 0,06 8 0,04 2 0,01 1 0,00 6 0,01 1 0,01 23 0,04 13 0,02 5 0,03 4 0,02 0 0,00 1 0,00 0,03 0,26
e Other e 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,02
4 Mangement´s Analysis 4 2 0,011765 3 0,017143 3 0,02 2 0,03 10 0,05 22 0,10 12 0,04 26 0,04 1 0,01 11 0,02 9 0,02 6 0,03 3 0,01 5 0,01 15 0,04 0,03 1,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,10 130
a Financial data a 1 0,005882 0 0 0 0,00 1 0,01 1 0,00 8 0,03 1 0,00 10 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,01 0,19
b Management Operating Data b 0 0 1 0,005714 3 0,02 0 0,00 2 0,01 4 0,02 2 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,17
c Macroeconomic Trends c 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,03
d Market changes / Momentum d 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 1 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 2 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0,00 0,07
e Forward-looking Information e 1 0,005882 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 1 0,00 9 0,01 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,02 2 0,01 0 0,00 5 0,01 0,01 0,19
f Other External Trends Affecting the Company f 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,04
g Management's plans/ targets, including critical success factors g 0 0 2 0,011429 0 0,00 1 0,01 2 0,01 2 0,01 4 0,01 4 0,01 1 0,01 1 0,00 1 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 3 0,01 6 0,02 0,01 0,24
h Other h 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,02 1 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0,00 0,08
5 Risk and Opportunities 5 4 0,023529 1 0,005714 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 1 0,00 1 0,00 24 0,03 0 0,00 19 0,03 6 0,01 14 0,07 2 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,01 1,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,07 76
a Risks a 2 0,011765 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 13 0,02 0 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 11 0,06 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,47
b Opportunities b 2 0,011765 1 0,005714 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 9 0,01 0 0,00 16 0,03 5 0,01 3 0,02 2 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,01 0,46
c Swot c 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,06
d Other d 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
6 Long Term Value Creators 6 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 9
a Excellence / Inovation / Company Specific a 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 1,00
b Other b 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
7 Background Information 7 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 68 0,31 57 0,25 48 0,18 65 0,09 21 0,13 16 0,03 27 0,05 12 0,06 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0,07 1,00 0,10 0,01 0,00 0,25 319
a Objectives / Strategy a 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 7 0,03 0 0,00 15 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0,06
b Vision / Mission b 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
c General development of the business c 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 10 0,05 12 0,05 8 0,03 8 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,13
d Products d 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 21 0,10 12 0,05 20 0,07 13 0,02 4 0,02 0 0,00 8 0,01 4 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,02 0,27
e Industry / Markets e 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 16 0,07 12 0,05 15 0,06 20 0,03 7 0,04 6 0,01 5 0,01 4 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,02 0,26
f Processes f 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
g Customers / Clients g 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 11 0,05 12 0,05 5 0,02 2 0,00 5 0,03 6 0,01 2 0,00 4 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,17
h Competitors h 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 5 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 1 0,01 2 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,04
i Properties i 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 5 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
j External regulation / Legal Conditions j 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 5 0,02 2 0,01 0 0,00 2 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,03
l Other l 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,02 2 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,03
8 Comparable measures 8 7 0,041176 4 0,022857 6 0,04 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 1 0,00 4 0,01 2 0,01 23 0,04 25 0,04 6 0,03 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,02 1,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,04 80
a Financial and opertating  data a 3 0,017647 0 0 4 0,03 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 2 0,00 0 0,00 6 0,01 5 0,01 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,32
b Other Comparisons across peers and competitors b 1 0,005882 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,01 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 5 0,01 6 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,14
c Stock Performance  / Company Valuation c 3 0,017647 4 0,022857 2 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 2 0,01 12 0,02 14 0,03 3 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0,52
d Other d 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,02
9 Segment information 9 13 0,076471 26 0,148571 25 0,16 3 0,04 3 0,01 15 0,07 37 0,14 126 0,18 31 0,19 99 0,18 74 0,13 17 0,09 8 0,04 30 0,08 72 0,21 0,12 1,00 0,06 0,00 0,01 0,21 579
a Industry / Market /Geography / Products a 13 0,076471 26 0,148571 25 0,16 3 0,04 3 0,01 15 0,07 37 0,14 126 0,18 31 0,19 99 0,18 74 0,13 17 0,09 8 0,04 30 0,08 72 0,21 0,12 1,00
b Other b 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
10 Corporate governace / Information about management and shareholders 10 0 0 0 0 3 0,02 2 0,03 14 0,06 19 0,08 8 0,03 24 0,03 7 0,04 10 0,02 14 0,03 15 0,08 0 0,00 1 0,00 13 0,04 0,03 1,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,08 130
a Board structure and assignments a 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,01
b Division of power between board and management b 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
c Governance in general c 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0,00 0,01
d Shareholders / Stakes d 0 0 0 0 2 0,01 1 0,01 11 0,05 9 0,04 6 0,02 14 0,02 0 0,00 0 0,00 7 0,01 11 0,06 0 0,00 0 0,00 7 0,02 0,02 0,54
e Transactions and relationsghips among related parties e 0 0 0 0 1 0,01 1 0,01 2 0,01 10 0,04 1 0,00 6 0,01 6 0,04 10 0,02 7 0,01 4 0,02 0 0,00 1 0,00 5 0,01 0,01 0,41
f Other f 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 4 0,01 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,02
11 Intellectual capital / Intangible Assets 11 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 2 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 8
a Employees a 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
b Core competences b 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,07
c Core knowledge and technology c 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,27
d Organizational, structural & relational capital d 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 1 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,39
e Patents  / Brand e 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 2 0,00 1 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,27
f Other f 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
12 Analysts analysis / Opinion 12 100 0,588235 88 0,50 77 0,50 52 0,67 84 0,39 75 0,33 82 0,30 338 0,48 89 0,54 260 0,47 301 0,54 83 0,42 131 0,60 229 0,58 158 0,47 0,49 1,00 0,10 0,01 0,30 0,67 2147
a Financial Information a 14 0,082353 10 0,057143 15 0,10 7 0,09 15 0,07 20 0,09 11 0,04 50 0,07 5 0,03 34 0,06 28 0,05 10 0,05 29 0,13 44 0,11 25 0,07 0,07 0,15
b Management Operating Information b 14 0,082353 3 0,017143 8 0,05 7 0,09 12 0,06 2 0,01 10 0,04 39 0,06 15 0,09 25 0,05 57 0,10 5 0,03 26 0,12 45 0,11 20 0,06 0,06 0,13
c Macroeconomic trends c 2 0,011765 6 0,034286 2 0,01 3 0,04 8 0,04 2 0,01 0 0,00 19 0,03 3 0,02 16 0,03 11 0,02 3 0,02 2 0,01 1 0,00 0 0,00 0,02 0,04
d Market Industry changes / momentum d 2 0,011765 12 0,068571 7 0,05 1 0,01 3 0,01 3 0,01 3 0,01 32 0,05 10 0,06 15 0,03 45 0,08 2 0,01 13 0,06 7 0,02 16 0,05 0,04 0,07
e Forward-looking information e 34 0,2 29 0,165714 29 0,19 21 0,27 35 0,16 23 0,10 14 0,05 50 0,07 27 0,16 67 0,12 76 0,14 8 0,04 29 0,13 49 0,12 40 0,12 0,14 0,28
f Other external trends affecting the company f 4 0,023529 1 0,005714 10 0,06 1 0,01 3 0,01 0 0,00 8 0,03 27 0,04 7 0,04 11 0,02 4 0,01 4 0,02 8 0,04 27 0,07 12 0,04 0,03 0,06
g Management's plans/actions, including critical success factors g 10 0,058824 3 0,017143 4 0,03 5 0,06 2 0,01 10 0,04 12 0,04 18 0,03 0 0,00 11 0,02 8 0,01 11 0,06 1 0,00 12 0,03 0 0,00 0,03 0,06
h Stock Estimation / Company Overall Analysis / Stock Performance h 6 0,035294 11 0,062857 2 0,01 7 0,09 3 0,01 8 0,03 14 0,05 43 0,06 19 0,12 58 0,11 47 0,08 28 0,14 6 0,03 9 0,02 12 0,04 0,06 0,12
i Past estimation accuracy  / Relative reliability / Comparation to last estimations / Change in Estimations i 5 0,029412 7 0,04 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 7 0,03 7 0,03 18 0,03 0 0,00 5 0,01 4 0,01 4 0,02 10 0,05 12 0,03 13 0,04 0,02 0,04
j Investments Strategy / Evaluation Assumptions) j 9 0,052941 6 0,034286 0 0,00 0 0,00 3 0,01 0 0,00 3 0,01 42 0,06 3 0,02 18 0,03 21 0,04 8 0,04 7 0,03 23 0,06 20 0,06 0,03 0,06
SI 20 39 0 43 36 1 36 21 3 0 0 10 96 124 184 1,00
NI 3 3 0 1 16 38 18 25 0 7 7 1 9 6 12
Text  Codification Units (Total) 170 1,00 175 1,00 155 1,00 78 1,00 217 1,00 230 1,00 271 1,00 704 1,00 164 1,00 552 1,00 558 1,00 197 1,00 218 1,00 398 1,00 338 4425 295
Maps Codification Units (Total) 66 52 56 52 120 148 128 246 60 117 120 71 196 334 410 2176
Maps 28 22 21 23 60 71 71 120 37 66 55 40 91 113 166 984
Setences 92 75 45 44 130 130 162 408 69 212 219 104 158 171 169
Amp
13 14 157 8 9 10 11 121 2 3 4 5 6
EDP REN JM PT S IND BRISA EDP AKLTRI REN SEMAPAEDP REN ME CIMPOR JM PORT TD
Appendix D: Growth Drivers/Value Drivers and Segmented Information 
 
Growth Driver / Value Drivers Segmented Information 
Altri 
 BHKP Prices 
 Pulp Prices 
 New Capacity Investments 
 Expansion Movements  
 Celbi 
 Caima 
 Celtejo 
 Portugal 
 Brazil 
 Spain 
 South Africa 
 Egypt 
 China 
 India 
Brisa 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Oil Prices 
 Events affecting traffic 
 
 Main concession 
 Atlântico 
 Brisal 
 Douro Litoral 
 Northwest Parkway  
 Brasil 
Cimpor 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Expansion Movements 
 New Capacity Investments 
 Portugal 
 Espanha  
 Marrocos 
 Tunisia 
 Egipto 
 Turquia 
 Brasil 
 Moçambique 
 Àfrica do Sul 
 Cabo Verde 
 China 
EDP 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Generation & Supply (Iberia) 
 Renewables    
 Distribution (Iberia)  
 Gas (Iberia)       
 Br    
 Others & Adjustments 
EDPR 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments/Acquisitions/Capex 
 Capacity Increases  
 Portugal  
 Spain 
 RoE 
 USA 
 Other 
Jerónimo 
Martins 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 Expansion Movements / Stores Openings 
 Biedronka 
 Pingo Doce 
 Feira Nova 
 Ex-Plus Stores 
 Poland 
 Portugal 
 Easter Europe 
 Retail 
 Mini-Hypers 
 Cash Carry (Recheio) 
 Hard-Discounters 
Mota Engil 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Governmental and other Institutional 
Investments 
 Expansion Movements  
 Events affecting traffic 
 Oil Prices 
 Construction  
  Env. & Services (Waste Management ; Water 
Supply)  
  Concessions 
 Portugal 
 Angola 
 East Europe 
 Slovakia 
 Mozambique 
 Peru 
 Triu 
 Suma 
Portucel 
 BEKP Prices 
 UWF Prices 
 New Investments 
 New Capacity  
 BEKP (Activity) 
 UWF (Activity) 
 Energy 
PT 
 Wireline  
 Vivo 
 TMN 
 Number of Costumers/Subscribers 
 Market Share 
REN 
 New Investments  
 Investments in Regulated Assets (RAB) 
 New Rates (ROR) 
 Capex Schedule  
 Gaz (business) 
 Electricity 
 Telecom  
 Portugal (Geography) 
 Spain 
 Eua 
Semapa 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments 
 Pulp Prices  
 
 Portucel (Pulp & Paper) 
 Secil (Cement) (Angola, Lebanon, Tunisia 
 ETSA (Animals foos) 
Sonae 
Industria 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Capex 
 
 Iberia  
 Central Europe    
 Rest of the World   
 North Ireland 
TD 
 Macro Economic Environment 
 New Investments  
 Governmental and other Institutional 
Investments 
 Expansion Movements  
 International Construction 
 Retail (Food, Auto, Fuel etc) 
 Real Estate 
 Algeria, Spain. Mozambique, Angola 
 Africa 
 
 
 
Appendix E – Rating History 
 
EDP Renováveis 
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Portugal Telecom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 €
3 €
4 €
5 €
6 €
7 €
8 €
9 €
Ja
n
-0
9
Fe
v-
0
9
M
ar
-0
9
A
b
r-
0
9
M
ai
-0
9
Ju
n
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
A
go
-0
9
Se
t-
0
9
O
u
t-
0
9
N
o
v-
0
9
D
ez
-0
9
Closing Price Price Target
2 €
3 €
4 €
5 €
6 €
7 €
8 €
Ja
n
-0
9
Fe
v-
0
9
M
ar
-0
9
A
b
r-
0
9
M
ai
-0
9
Ju
n
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
A
go
-0
9
Se
t-
0
9
O
u
t-
0
9
N
o
v-
0
9
D
ez
-0
9
Closing Price Price Target
2 €
3 €
4 €
5 €
6 €
7 €
8 €
9 €
10 €
Ja
n
-0
9
Fe
v-
0
9
M
ar
-0
9
A
b
r-
0
9
M
ai
-0
9
Ju
n
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
A
go
-0
9
Se
t-
0
9
O
u
t-
0
9
N
o
v-
0
9
D
ez
-0
9
Closing Price Price Target
Date Price Target Closing Price 
11-02-2009 6.80 5.73 
22-07-2009 6.80 7.17 
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08-01-2009 6.10 3.66 
21-10-2009 6.50 6.00 
Date Price Target Closing Price 
29-01-2009 7.30 6.22 
04-05-2009 7.40 5.95 
04-08-2009 7.40 7.18 
29-10-2009 9.00 7.93 
17-12-2009 9.00 8.32 
  
 
Sonae Industria 
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27-07-2009 4.20 2.79 
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27-10-2009 4.20 3.00 
10-12-2009 3.95 3.95 
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Cimpor 
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Date Price Target Closing Price 
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23-04-2009 5.00 3.00 
25-08-2009 5.00 3.43 
31-08-2009 5.00 3.31 
17-11-2009 5.00 4.08 
14-12-2009 5.35 3.52 
Date Price Target Closing Price 
01-01-2009 5.00 3.64 
01-09-2009 5.25 5.04 
01-10-2009 5.55 5.59 
01-11-2009 5.55 5.31 
  
Jerónimo Martins 
 
Portucel 
 
 
Teixeira Duarte 
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Date Price Target Closing Price 
13-07-2009 3.30 2.93 
29-07-2009 3.30 2.89 
29-10-2009 3.30 3.01 
02-12-2009 3.75 2.99 
01-03-2010 3.75 2.99 
04-05-2010 3.40 2.62 
17-06-2010 3.05 2.60 
Date Price Target Closing Price 
28-07-2009 11.25 6.35 
26-08-2009 11.25 7.03 
28-10-2009 11.25 7.40 
02-12-2009 13.25 7.41 
02-02-2010 13.25 7.85 
08-02-2010 13.25 7.64 
29-04-2010 12.90 7.59 
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